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"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." 
-First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
"The word 'free' still existed in Newspeak, but it ... could not be used in its 
old sense of 'politically free' or 'intellectually free,' since political and intel-
lectual freedom no longer existed even as concepts." 
-G. Orwell, 1984 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The year 1984 may not have fulfilled Orwellian prophecies of 
governmental totalitarianism, but citizens of the world remain no 
less concerned about the quality of their civil liberties. If people 
could live peacefully and productively together under a strict caste 
system, or blissfully in enslavement, there would be little impetus 
to identify "natural rights" nor insistence upon what we know as 
"freedom." But human experience has amply demonstrated the 
universal yearning for personal liberty, as well as the need to legis-
late against its deprivation. Thus Big Brother has been the enemy 
from long before the Magna Carta and long since the Bill of 
Rights. 
In America, much of the battle has centered around the freedom 
of speech. The traditional justification for viewing the first amend-
ment's guarantee of free speech as virtually absolute-the excep-
tions are few and narrow in scope-is to encourage an open and 
unfettered exchange of ideas. Those thoughts that are abhorrent to 
a free society, the argument goes, will wither when aired but fester 
if suppressed. Moreover, who is to decide which ideas are abhor-
rent? Certainly not the government, reasoned the Constitution's 
Framers. The interests of the state, and the wisdom of the public 
servants elected or employed to run it, may well be inferior in 
quality: and motivation, not to mention right, to those of the peo-
ple. Free speech is so precious and delicate a liberty it must be 
preserved at great cost: thus the depth of conviction in Voltaire's 
oft-quoted declaration, "I disapprove of what you say but I will 
defend to the death your right to say it. "1 
1. There is some dOl,lbt that Voltaire actually uttered those famous words, but they do 
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That it is difficult to draw a line between acceptable and nonac-
ceptable expression, however, and hard to allocate responsibility 
for deciding what speech should be restricted, is too facile a ration-
ale for justifying a rule of absolute construction. The carefully 
drawn exceptions to the rule of free speech are based on logical 
demonstrations that there are certain utterances which must be 
limited. In recent years there has been growing support for yet an-
other exception: the restriction of speech the very essence of which 
is to deny the freedom, dignity, and humanity of an entire class of 
people, and the stated goal of which is to destructively attack a 
target group by stimulating hatred and/or fear in others-in short; 
racial defamation.2 
Can such an exception pass constitutional muster? With this 
question in mind, comparison of the civil liberties of nations which 
consider themselves "free" is enlightening. Sweden, for example, is 
a democratic country with laws that prohibit racial defamation. 
This article examines group libel in the context of civil liberties; in 
the process it compares the likely Swedish response to a hypotheti-
cally proposed Nazi demonstration on the streets of Stockholm 
with what did happen in Skokie, Illinois in the late 1970's. Conclu-
sions are drawn as to the moral, social, and practical value of 1984-
vintage anti-defamation laws which permit-nay, encourage-Big 
Brother to butt in and regulate that form of speech. 
II. COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES: THE UNITED 
STATES AND SWEDEN 
The fundamental freedoms sought to be protected by both the 
Framers of the American Constitution and those who created Swe-
den's governmental system are substantially the same. The means 
used to achieve and preserve them, however, are differ-
reflect an attitude attributed to him by S.G. Tallentyre (E. Beatrice Hall), an English 
writer, in her book THE FluENDs OF VOLTAIRE (1906), at 199. See B. STEVENSON, THE HOME 
BOOK OF QUOTATIONS (1956), at 726, 2276. For judicial use of the quote, see, e.g., People v. 
Kieran, 6 Misc. 2d 245, 265, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 291, 307 (1940). See also infra notes 128-49 and 
accompanying text. 
2. Making racial defamation an actionable tort, whether under the rubric of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress or otherwise, has been the subject of considerable de-
bate. See, e.g., Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, 
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982); Heins, Banning Words: A Com-
ment on "Words That Wound," 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 585 (1983); Delgado, Professor 
Delgado Replies, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 593 (1983). The discussion, however, too often 
takes for granted the constitutional validity of tort liability. This article seeks to address 
more thoroughly (and to overcome) the first-amendment difficulties involved. 
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ent-especially schema for protection of civil liberties. Both coun-
tries have a written exposition of rights that their governments are 
required to observe. In the United States, such liberties are pro-
tected primarily by an independent judiciary. In Sweden, while the 
courts· are independent, protection of civil liberties derives primar-
ily from the restraint and responsiveness exercised by the Riksdag 
(Parliament). 
A. Structural Differences and Similarities 
Although their approaches are decidedly different, both the 
Swedish and American systems seek to implement similar princi-
ples of representative democracy and equality before the law.3 The 
Constitution of the United States is a statement of fundamental 
values, specific provisions of which are construed in contemporary 
contexts by the federal courts. Swedish constitutional documents 
spell out rules for the implementation of basic values with great 
particularity.· In Sweden, rights and liberties are protected by 
"fundamental law" -a category which embraces not only the "In-
strument of Government" (Sweden's constitution), but also the 
Riksdag Act and the Freedom of the Press Act.1i These laws and 
the American Constitution share the characteristic of fundamental 
supremacy: each government remains bound by their provisions 
until the completion of a specific amendment process, which itself 
is designed to insure the participation (or at least approval) of the 
populace. Swedish fundamental laws can be altered only by two 
successive acts of the Riksdag separated by an intervening elec-
tion.6 The United States Constitution can be amended only 
through a cumbersome process which requires concurrence of two-
thirds of the legislators in each house and the approval of three-
fourths of the state legislatures.7 
3. Sweden's fundamental values are stated in its Instrument of Government at 1:1, 1:2, 
and 1:8. Article I of the United States Constitution manifests the value of representative 
democracy. See J. ELy, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 63 et seq. 
(1980). 
4. The prior Swedish Constitution was as general as the current United States Consti-
tution. The drafters of Sweden's new Instrument of Government, enacted in January, 1975 
[hereinafter IG), could look at two centuries of democracy and jurisprudence in the U.S. as 
a model of sorts for what fails and what succeeds. Moreover, the political climate surround-
ing ratification was not nearly so volatile in contemporary Sweden as was that of the United 
States in 1787. Thus the document itself could afford to be more specific. See H. DANELIUS, 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN SWEDEN 10 (1981). 
5. IG 1:2. 
6. IG 8:15. 
7. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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Other differences serve as well to reinforce similarities. In Swe-
den's form of representative democracy, members of the Riksdag 
are elected by popular vote.8 The prime minister (usually head of 
the party that commands a majority of seats) is responsible for the 
administrative/executive arm of the government;9 both he and his 
government can be removed at any time by a simple majority vote 
of Riksdag members.lo 
Another structural difference between the systems is their means 
of access to constitutional review. In the United States, an uncon-
stitutional action may not be reviewed by the courts unless and 
until a plaintiff has "standing" to bring suit; on occasion a legiti-
mate grievance is dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff's 
complaint is shared by so many others that it is too diluted to 
serve as the basis of a lawsuit.ll In Sweden there is a carefully 
structured system of ombudsmen, all of whom have standing to 
bring any court process. II Their duties are to investigate citizen 
complaints and take appropriate action, ranging from dismissal of 
the complaint to admonitions, reprimands, and institution of legal 
proceedings and recommendation of legislative action-in many 
senses protecting civil liberties against government encroach-
ment.IS 
In the United States judges may enforce only those laws that are 
consistent with the Constitution, both facially and as applied. l4 If 
the Supreme Court finds that a law is unconstitutional, lower 
courts are bound by that decision and the law is no longer 
8. IG 3:1. 
9. IG 62-64. 
10. IG 6:5. Should this happen, however, the prime minister can require that a new 
election be held before his dismissal becomes effective. IG 3:4. 
11. The doctrine of standing ostensibly developed in order to streamline the activities 
of federal courts. It has been criticized as an easy escape for a judge who is personally hos-
tile to the merits of a case. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Compare Flast 
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United 
for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
12. IG 12:6 provides that ombudsmen shall be elected by the Riksdag, and empowers 
them to institute court actions and to obtain information from any public agency or court. 
The institution of the ombudsman is described in detail in The Swedish Ombudsmen 
(Swedish Institute 1981). See also U. LUNDVIK, THE SWEDISH PARLIAMENTARY OMBUDSMEN 
(1982); [annual English-language) REPORT OF THE SWEDISH PARLIAMENTARY OMBUDSMEN 
(Swedish Government Publication). 
13. The office of the ombudsman has cast the differences between the two systems' 
processes of judicial review in an important light. See supra note 12. 
14. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803). To do otherwise is always re-
versible error. 
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enforced. 111 Thus court decisions in the United States often have 
the effect of legislation. 
In Sweden, the effect that courts can have is more limited. The 
Instrument of Government does not affirmatively provide for judi-
cial review, although it does prevent decisions of the country's 
highest courts from being reversed by the Riksdag.18 The Supreme 
Judicial Court first asserted its prerogative of judicial review in 
1964.17 The Riksdag, of course, may alter the substantive law in 
any manner that does not conflict with the IG (so long as the 
change is prospective only in its effect). Application of the laws, 
however, is an exclusive function of the judiciary: "No authority 
. . . may determine . . . how a court shall adjudicate a particular 
case . . . . "18 In this respect Swedish judicial review is similar to 
that in the UnJted States-both are based upon principles of judi-
cial independence and the fundamental nature of a written 
constitution. 19 
Swedish judicial decisions, however, have little of the legislative 
effect that characterizes decisions of American courts; the Swedish 
system more closely resembles the idea of judicial restraint that 
was prevalent during the Taney Court in the mid-19th century.so 
In large part this is due to the limitable nature of many Swedish 
civil liberties and the more explicit nature of the Instrument of 
Government itself.21 In Sweden, the nation is the fundamental gov-
ernmental unit, and local governments can exercise only such pow-
ers as are specifically delegated to them. The constitutional laws 
apply directly to municipalities as well. Thus it follows that there 
is no need for a Swedish counterpart to the incorporative feature 
of the 14th Amendment. 
B. Comparing Rights: Amendments Beyond the First 
Although the Swedish Instrument of Government is generally 
15. The principles of stare decisis and national supremacy are stated in U.S. CONST. 
art. VI § 2. 
16. Sweden has two supreme courts: The Supreme Judicial Court and the Supreme 
Administrative Court. IG 11:1. See U. NORDENSEN (trans. and commentstor) CONSTITU-
TIONAL DOCUMENTS OF SWEDEN 29 (1976). 
17. R. GINSBURG & A. BRAZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN 10, 131 (1965). 
18. IG 11:2. This has been interpreted to mean that Swedish precedents are not bind-
ing authority. M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 58-SO (1971). 
19. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 149 (1803). 
20. See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 18, at 59-69; R. NEWMEYER, THE SUPREME COURT 
UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 89-118 (1968). 
21. IG 2:12-2:15. 
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more explicit in its definition of rights-the U.S. Constitution is 
more a statement of fundamental policy22 which requires a greater 
degree of interpretation-nearly every civil liberty recognized in 
America has its Swedish counterpart.23 For example, the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment has 
corresponding Swedish provisions, which specifically proscribe cer-
tain types of punishment: capital punishment, torture, banish-
ment, and expatriation.2• 
Life, liberty, and property interests cannot be impaired by the 
U.S. government without "due process of law."211 State govern-
ments are similarly limited.2s In Sweden, too, there is constitu-
tional recognition for the reverence of Hfe,27 an<;llaws affecting lib-
erty or property are subject to various substantive and procedural 
restraints.28 Anyone deprived of liberty is entitled to prompt re-
view by a court, whether civil or criminal.29 No authority may 
usurp the court's function by directing its decision in a given 
case.so 
22. See W. LOCKHART, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 76 (1976). 
23. The provision of the Bill of Rights that is noticeably absent from the Swedish IG 
is the right to "keep and bear arms." U.S. CONST. amend. II. See generally Levin, Right to 
Bear Arms: The Development of the American Experience, 48 CHI. I-I KENT. L. REv. 148 
(1971). In October 1983, the Supreme Court let stand a ruling of the Seventh Circuit, Quilici 
v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 194 (1983), 
that the amendment did not guarantee a personal right to possess arms. The decision may 
signal a new approach to interpretation of this constitutional provision. The omission of this 
right from the Swedish IG has been explained by the theory that violence in any form is 
more consequentially distasteful to Sweden; murder is rare and handguns virtually nonexis-
tent. A. NELSON, REsPONSES TO CRIME: AN INTRODUCTION TO SWEDISH CRIMINAL LAW AND 
ADMINISTRATION 39. Sweden's failure to specify a right to keep and bear arms could also be 
viewed as an extension of liberty rather than a constriction, insofar as the Swedish citizen is 
thereby more likely to be free from armed attack. In addition to the absence of an arms 
guarantee, Sweden's Instrument of Government has no rule of construction paralleling the 
Ninth Amendment's catch-all clause (granting "other" rights to the people). See B. PATTER-
SON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955). 
24. IG 8:1 and 2:5. See Browdy & Saltzman, The Effectiveness of the Eight Amend-
ment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 846 (1961); Gra-
nucci, "Nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. 
REv. 839 (1969). 
25. This clause has prompted voluminous litigation. See LoCKHART, supra note 22, at 
420 et. seq.; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 427 et seq. (1978). 
26. See R. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 379-82 (1981). 
27. IG 8:1. 
28. IG 8:2-8:5. These sections do not purport to limit the power of the Riksdag in any 
way, but carve out areas of administrative power in such a manner that they are cased 
firmly within the scope of legislative power. IG 2:18 provides a right to compensation when 
the government takes private property for public use. 
29. IG 11:3. 
30. IG 11:2. 
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The Instrument of Government, in its version of a preamble, de-
clares equality before the law as a fundamental value.31 Moreover, 
no law or other decree may even imply the discrimination of any 
citizen because of race or ethnic origin, or on the grounds of his 
belonging to a minority.32 Sexual discrimination is likewise forbid-
den-"unless the relevant provision forms part of efforts to bring 
about equality between men and women or concerns compulsory 
military service."33 The exclusive protection of minorities suggests 
that Swedish versions of "affirmative action" programs would not 
be vulnerable to Bakke-type challenges.3• In the United States, 
age311 and sex86 discrimination by the government (and some pri-
vate entities) are forbidden by statutes, and racial and religious 
discrimination by the Constitution.37 
Although Swedish civil liberties may be enumerated in detail, 
the rights of persons accused of crimes are not so broadly devel-
oped as they are in· America. A prohibition against search and 
seizure by the government is cast in absolute terms (rather than 
merely prohibiting "unreasonable" intrusions),38 but it is clear that 
many of the procedural safeguards enjoyed by Swedes (including 
the right to be free of searches and seizures) are susceptible to lim-
itation by legislative acts.39 While the right to a trial is guaran-
teed,·o there is no requirement that a trial by jury be available to a 
criminal defendant (except in prosecutions under the Press Act),U 
nor a specific prohibition of compelled self-incrimination (except 
31. Id. 
32. IG 2:15. See Oberg, Is Sweden Ripe For Racism?, 27 SOCIAL CHANGE IN SWEDEN 
(Feb. 1983) (concluding that "the nation as a whole is determined not to let racists and 
discriminators have a free hand"). 
33. Id. 
34. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), casts some 
doubt upon the validity of the use of racial classifications as a broad means of remedying 
the efforts of past discrimination. 
35. See The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-632 (1976 and 
1981 Supp.). 
36. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Equal Employment Opportunities, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 and 1981 Supp.) (sex discrinlination in employment); Title 
IX of The Education Amendment Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (sex discrimination 
in education). 
37. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was the seminal case in the area 
of racial discrimination; as to religion, see West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
But see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
38. U.S. CONST. amend IV; IG 2:6. 
39. IG 2:12-2:14. 
40. IG 11:3. 
41. FPA 12.2. 
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where coercion of medical information is involved).42 Nevertheless, 
pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights48-to 
which Sweden is a signatory-the observed practice is to afford 
criminal defendants a "presumption of innocence,"44 the right to 
court-appointed counsel,46 the right to compel defense witnesses to 
testify,4e and the right to cross-examine all prosecution witnesses.4? 
The Instrument of Government does include a prohibition of ex 
post facto laws,48 and a right in criminal cases to a public trial 
without undue delay.49 
C. Comparing Rights: First Amendment Freedoms 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution is a 
brief and eloquent statement of principle, explicitly enumerating 
basic liberties which cannot be abrogated by governmental action. 
The courts have necessarily assumed the role of interpreting what 
those rights are in the factual settings of cases where first amend-
ment freedoms are claimed. As noted earlier, chapter 2 of the 
Swedish Instrument of Government is substantially more specific 
in its enumeration of similar rights;60 therefore, Swedish courts 
have not been required to undertake the interpretive function. 
Protection for freedom of religion is common to both the First 
Amendment61 and the Instrument of Government. Although the 
Lutheran church is the state church in Sweden, each person is 
guaranteed the right to be free from governmental coercion to join 
or support any religious body, or to make known his religious (or 
political) opinions.62 Conversely, the individual's right to practice 
his own religion and to join with others in so doing is absolutely 
42. IG 2:5. 
43. The Conventions provide a broad range of human rights and establish a court to 
supervise these rights on an international level. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L.-C. 
CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 197 n.l03 (1980). Sweden has submitted to 
the international court's jurisdiction. [d. at 298, 569-610. See also BASIC DOCUMENTS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 338 (I. Brownlie ed. 1971), where permissible restrictions on chi! liberties 
are defined. 
44. DANELIUS, supra note 4, at 10. 
45. McDOUGAL & CHEN, supra note 43. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. 
48. IG 2:10. 
49. IG 11:3. 
50. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
51. U.S. CONST. Amend. I. 
52. IG 2:1.6. This juxtaposition of religious and political freedoms reflects the Swedish 
consciousness of the overlap between politics and religion. 
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protected. liS While certain otherwise protected liberties may be 
limited by acts of the Riksdag,1I4 the freedom of religion provision 
conspicuously cannot. 
This, of course, does not mean that Swedish freedom of religion 
is unrestricted, any more than the absolute language of the First 
Amendment conveys unlimited freedom of religion upon Ameri-
cans. The United States Supreme Court has held that, although 
belief itself is absolutely protected, action done in its furtherance 
is subject to governmental regulation;1I11 certain state interests, 
manifested in laws based on secular purposes, may be overriding.1I6 
A comparable line of reasoning applies in Sweden: religious expres-
sions, themselves absolutely protected, are invariably manifested 
through exercise of a "restrictable" freedom such as that of associ-
ation, assembly, press, or expression; the belief itself, however, re-
mains inviolate. 
A more detailed analysis of First Amendment rights appears in 
the context of the Skokie case, discussed later within this article. 
Here it need be reiterated only that freedom of speech and of the 
press and the right peaceably to assemble and petition the govern-
ment are plainly guaranteed; the Supreme Court has elaborated 
upon the rights of expressionll7 and association,1I8 attendance at 
criminal trials,1I9 and broadest of all, the right to privacy.6o 
Prior governmental restraints on the exercise of first amendment 
freedoms carry a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.61 Less 
severe restrictions are evaluated through a balancing approach, 
with the need for regulation weighed against the degree of protec-
tion that expression should enjoy.6l1 These limitations have been 
judicially developed, since the Constitution makes no provision in 
53. [d. 
54. IG 2:12-2:14. 
55. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). 
56. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. i45 (1878). See generally LoCKHART, supra 
note 22, at 1215; TRIBE, supra note 25, at 833. 
57. This includes the right to speak as well as to refrain from speaking, Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), and extends to "symbolic expression," Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
58. See D. FELLMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF AsSOCIATION passim (1963). 
59. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
60. Griswold v. Connecticut, 341 U.S. 479 (1965). 
61. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 
U.S. 697 (1931). But see Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) (injunction of sale of 
allegedly obscene material upheld). 
62. Bogan, Balancing Freedom of Speech, 38 MD. L. REv. 387 (1979). 
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its text for any restrictions.68 
The Swedish counterpart of these first amendment rights are de-
scribed with some specificity.64 Thus guaranteed are the freedom 
of expression;611 the right to receive information;66 freedom of as-
sembly;67 the right to demonstrate;68 freedom of association;89 and 
a citizen's right to keep his opinions to himself.70 
Freedom of the press in Sweden is guaranteed separately by the 
Freedom of the Press Act (FPA). Its first chapter provides that 
there shall be no content-based restrictions except those in keeping 
with "general law." Prior restraints are prohibited. Chapter 2 de-
tails the right of the press to gain access to official documents; 
Chapter 3 protects anonymity of "sources"; Chapters 4 and 5 regu-
late the licensing and registration of editors and publishers, and 
define their responsibility; Chapters 7 and 8 concern criminal lia-
bility for failure to comply with the FPA requirements, among 
other things providing the accused a right to jury trial; Chapter 10 
authorizes seizure and suppression of "illegal" materials; and 
Chapter 11 addresses civil liability for defamation. 
The noteworthy difference from the U.S. Constitution is that the 
Instrument of Government explicitly sets limits on the exercise of 
many liberties.71 The Riksdag may act to restrict various freedoms 
of expression, assembly, association, etc., but only within definite 
limits. 
Such restriction. . . may be made only for achievement of a purpose which 
is acceptable in a democratic 8ociety. The restriction may never go beyond 
what is necessary with regard to the purpose which has given rise to it[;] 
neither may it be extended 80 far that it constitutes a threat against the free 
formation of opinion as one of the foundations of democracy. No restriction 
may be made solely on the grounds of political, religious, cultural, or other 
such ideas.71 
63. See infra Section m. 
64. IG 2:1. This 8ection spells out the right to obtain information and to "demon-
strate" on publicly owned property. 
65. IG 2:1.1. 
66. IG 2:1.2. In the United States this is not a privilege of constitutional dimension, 
but a statutory one. 
67. IG 2:1.3. 
68. IG 2:1.5. 
69. IG 2:1.6 
70. IG 2:2. 
71. IG 2:12-2:14. 
72. IG 2:12. Such restrictions on the Riksdag's power to limit protected liberties are 
cast in terms of broad policy statements similar to the guarantees found in the Bill of 
Rights. As such, they seem to expresa a recognition of judicial review. 
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This governmental philosophy disfavoring content-based restric-
tions is completely compatible with most other rights granted by 
the Instrument of Government, as well as with American notions 
of civil liberties. Even with such similar philosophies, specific na-
tional differences arise. The Swedish government may, for exam-
ple, constitutionally place limits on the freedom to make state-
ments about economic activities.73 "The freedom of association 
may be restricted only as regards such associations the activities of 
which are of a military or similar nature or which involve the per-
secution of a national group of a particular race, of a particular 
skin colour, or of a particular ethnic origin."7. One law, the power 
of which is derived from that provision, bans the wearing of an 
unauthorized military uniform in public: "It is prohibited to carry 
uniforms or similar clothing that identify the political orientation 
of the person wearing the uniform." This prohibition can also ap-
ply to parts of uniforms, arm bands and other similar clearly visi-
ble means of identification.711 Another prohibits the defamation of 
a race: 
If a person publicly or otherwise in a statement or other communication 
which is spread among the public threatens or expresses contempt for a 
group of a certain race, skin color, national creed, he shall be sentenced for 
agitation against ethnic group to imprisonment for at most two years or, if 
the crime is petty, to pay a fine. 78 
Taken together, it seems clear that a march of Nazis through the 
streets of Stockholm would be- preventable as a clear violation of 
the law, unprotected by any claims of "fundamental freedom." 
It must be remembered that the Instrument of Government is a 
relatively new constitution, so any in-depth analysis of Swedish 
free expression is difficult. It would seem, though, that the situa-
tional flexibility suggests one substantial criticism. In the absence 
of a strong and independent judiciary, the civil liberties "guaran-
teed" by the Swedish system could be virtually meaningless-the 
Riksdag has constitutional power to override them.77 The apparent 
conclusion, however, is that the Swedish people appear to be less 
73. IG 2:13. A similar statutory restriction in the United States would be patently 
unconstitutional. 
74. IG 2:14. 
75. SFS 1947:164. Violation of this prohibition is punishable by day fines (determined 
by one day's income). What has been worn is forfeited .... [d. 
76. SWED. PENAL CODE ch. 16 § 8 (1972). 
77. It is important to remember in this connection, however, that the International 
Court of Human Rights is responsible for supervision of the Swedish protections. 
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fearful of a majoritarian tyranny than before, and more trustful of 
their democratic process. Certainly there is no social or historical 
justification for describing Sweden as anything other than a free 
and democratic country.78 
Sweden is characterized by a relatively homogeneous and so-
cially structured culture. Swedes are far more interrelated with 
(sometimes dependent upon) their government than Americans. 
They appear to have great thrust in their democratic process and 
look to it for protection of their civil liberties. The fact that the 
government pervades the lives of the people in such an apparently 
benign way should be taken as a measure of personal security, not 
an indication of authoritarianism. Thus the Swedish laws prohibit-
ing defamation of a race are, to the people who live under them, 
innocuous, particularly when contrasted with the oppressions exer-
cised by Nazi Germany which threatened all of Europe79 in the 
name of race superiority. History, as well as philosophy, shapes so-
ciety's degree of toleration for laws. 
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SPEECH IN SKOKIE 
A. The Nazis in Skokie 
1. Purposes and Passions: A Chronological Summary80 
Skokie, Illinois bills itself as "the world's largest village." A 
78. Of course, a large gulf can exist between the theory and practice of civil liberties. 
The Soviet Constitution, for example, is a model of guarantees for the natural rights of man. 
Few observers, however, would characterize life in RU88ia as free by traditional democratic 
standards. See R. SHARLET, THE NEW SOVIET CONSTITUTION OF 1977 16-17 (1978). By con-
trast, Sweden delivers a good deal more than it promises. See Oberg, Is Sweden Ripe For 
Racism, 27 SOCIAL CHANGE IN SWEDEN 6 (Feb. 1983). 
79. For the experience of.Jews and non-Jews in Sweden's neighbor, Denmark, see, e.g., 
Jacobs, When the New Year Came in Springtime, Liberty, at 2-6 (Sept.-Oct. 1979). Sweden 
itself was neutral, and was not directly occupied by Nazi Germany. Of course, it neverthe-
less was under the Nazi shadow. See generally R. PAXTON, EUROPE IN THE TwENTIETH CEN-
TURY (1975). 
SO. The events that took place in Skokie, Illinois, between March 1977 and June 1978 
have been documented in detail elsewhere; likewise, the purposes and passions of the princi-
ples involved have been speculated upon and analyzed in depth. Which parties won the 
battles, and who won the war, continue to be hotly debated questions. What follows in this 
subsection, therefore, is a brief chronological summary, together with some editorial conclu-
sions based on a consensus of the commentators and the writer's own admitted biases. See 
A. NBlBR, DEPENDING My ENEMY (1979); Hamlin, Swastikas and Survivors, 4 CIV. Lm. REv. 
8 (Mar.-Apr. 1978). See also Danon, Illinois Supreme Court and the Appellate Court Deci-
sions Regarding Prior Restraint, In Skokie v. The American Nazi Party, 67 ILL. B.J. 540-49 
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suburb of Chicago, it has a population over 70,000B1-of whom 
some 45,000 are JewishB2 and a significant number survivors of 
Nazi concentration camps.BS That statistical characteristic, to-
gether with the well-grounded suspicion that the appearance of 
Nazi uniforms in Skokie would provoke a vehement, almost para-
noid reaction among many residents, served to encourage a small 
militant gang which called itself the American Nazi Party.B4 In 
early 1977, Frank Collin-self-styled leader of the American Na-
zis-applied for permits to demonstrate in various Chicago sub-
urbs for the stated purpose of attracting attention to his "cause."BG 
Hindsight permits the conclusion that, by their immediate and 
outraged response, the residents of Skokie helped Collin accom-
plish his purpose. The other communities approached by the Nazis 
had managed to rebuff them by way of innocuous demurrer: "We 
are unable to accommodate you at this time," or "the space that 
you requested has been previously reserved."BB Skokie, however, 
used a legalistic device: it would acquiesce to the Nazis' re-
quest-provided that the group posted a huge insurance bond.B7 
Such a requirement, of course, would be difficult if not impossible 
for Collin and his followers to meet.8B 
The American Nazi Party was hardly a novice at constitutional 
jurisprudence. It had already been successful in challenging similar 
bonding requirements,B9 and Collin immediately recognized that he 
was in a good legal position to attract considerable attention to his 
group and irritate a sizeable number of Jews in the process. On 
March 20, 1977, he sent a letter to the town, announcing that his 
people would picket the Skokie municipal building to protest the 
denial of the permit.90 
The village of Skokie filed suit to enjoin the demonstration, and 
(1979); Horowitz & Bramson, Skokie, The ACLU and the Endurance of Democratic The-
ory, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 328-48 (1979). 
81. NEIER, supra note 80, at 39. 
82. Hamlin, supra note 80, at 10. 
83. Id. 
84. Neier discusses the various splinter groups within the neo-Nazi fascist fringe in the 
United States since World War II, among them the American Nazi Party, the National 
Renaissance Party, and the National Socialists White People's Party. The American Nazis 
under Collin claimed to have 40 members. NEIER, supra note 80, at 13-16. 
85. Hamlin, supra note SO. 
86. Id. 
87. The bond was in the amount of $350,000. 
88. Id. 
89. NEIER, supra note SO, at 38-39. 
90. Id. 
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an Illinois court issued an injunction prohibiting Collin's group 
from either marching or displaying a swastika.91 
The Nazis, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, 
appealed,92 but no Illinois appellate court would either stay the in-
junction pending appeal or grant an expedited review of the trial 
court's decision.9a The ACLU thereafter appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held 
that prior restraints on free expression could be valid only if the 
state provides strict procedural safeguards, such as immediate ap-
pellate review; without these safeguards, a state appellate court 
must stay an injunction. H On remand, the intermediate appellate 
court modified its injunction, permitting the Nazis to demonstrate 
so long as no swastika would be displayed.95 
The ACLU, however, persisted in defending the principle that 
the Nazis' activity, however abhorrent, amounted to no more than 
speech, and as such was protected by the Constitution. This time 
the Illinois Supreme Court felt constrained to agree, and concluded 
that the injunction should be vacated in its entirety." 
In the meanwhile, the village of Skokie had passed several new 
ordinances aimed at keeping the Nazis out of town. The ordi-
nances provided, among other things, that permits had to be ob-
tained (and insurance bonds posted) before any public parades or 
assemblies could be held; that dissemination of material which was 
intended to incite racial or religious hatred was forbidden; and that 
public demonstrations by political parties whose members wore 
military uniforms were also prohibited.97 
Passage of these ordinances brought the inevitable Constitu-
tional challenge from Collin and the ACLU-and this time a fed-
eral district court found the laws to be unconstitutional.98 A pre-
dictable scenario ensued, as the United States Court of Appeals 
91. Id. at 43. 
92. Id at 48. See also National Socialist Party of American v. Village of Skokie, 432 
U.S. 43 (1977). 
93. See id. 
94. Id. Justice White would have denied the stay. Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, and 
Chief Justice Burger dissented on the grounds that no final state court decision had been 
rendered. Id. at 44-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
95. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 51 ill.App.3d 279 (1977), 
rev 'd. in part, 69 ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978). 
96. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 69 ill.2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 
21 (1978). 
97. Skokie Mun. Ord. 994-96 (1977). See also NEIER, supra note SO, at 48-49. 
98. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. ill. 1978), aff'd., 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978). 
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affirmed the result99 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.loo 
Ultimately, although the Nazis had won the right to march in 
Skokie, they never did so. Collin achieved exactly what he had set 
out to do: he attracted national attention to his controversial cause 
by provoking the Jews of Skokie into visible outrage.10l 
2. The Failed Constitutional Arguments 
The village of Skokie attempted to prevent the Nazis from 
marching through the municipality in their uniforms. It failed be-
cause the town was unable to formulate precisely why the Nazi 
parade should not be protected by the first amendment. In retro-
spect, it is not difficult to understand why the traditional excep-
tions to the free speech guarantee were argued unsuccessfully. 
Under the "fighting words" exception, first enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in 1942,102 utterances that are directed face-to-face 
at an individual who had not voluntarily exposed himself to invec-
tive are deemed the practical equivalent of immediate, shocking, 
injurious-and restrainable-speech aimed at a "captive audi-
ence." The most famous example was provided by Justice Holmes: 
"No freedom of speech would protect one who falsely shouts fire in 
a theater and causes panic. "loa Theater patrons are captive (having 
no advance warning of a statement or demonstration, they are not 
free to avoid it), the message is false/o• and opposing speech is 
inefficacious. "Fighting words" have the same elements of surprise, 
and will likely provoke a response (violence, as opposed to panic) 
from a listener who had no chance to avoid listening. Such expres-
sion has passed into the realm of abuse of the freedom of speech. 
Skokie's argument based on "fighting words" was inappropriate, 
in that both the speakers (uniformed Nazis) and the addressees 
(the populace of Skokie) were groups. The doctrine of fighting 
words requires individual, one-on-one provocation; the courts 
would not accept the argument that the Nazis' symbolic anti-Se-
mitic speech constituted fighting words directed against each Jew 
99. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978). 
100. 436 U.S. 953 (1978). 
101. See NEIER, supra note 80, at 58-62. 
102. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
103. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
104. It should be stressed that this criterion loses its value when the speech contains 
statements that are not verifiably true or false but are expressions of doctrine or opinion. It 
is the immediacy of the message that permits it to inflict damage before opposing speech 
can counter its effects. 
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in Skokie. 1011 Furthermore, the advance publicity of the parade 
eliminated the element of surprise. loe Neither, suggested the court, 
was any resident forced to witness the Nazi march: knowing in ad-
vance that the swastika would be displayed in the town square 
(usually deserted on weekends anyway), those offended could eas-
ily avoid seeing it by staying away.107 
For much the same reason, the clear-and-present-danger argu-
mentl08 also failed. Advocacy of a viewpoint must not cross the line 
between public peace and spontaneously solicited violence; where 
incitement to riot is the speaker's very purpose, it is "a substantive 
evil which the state has a right to prevent."109 Even then, the 
speech remains protected unless there is a reasonable likelihood of 
imminent lawless action against a third party. no Neither of these 
conditions existed in Skokie: any violence would have been di-
rected against the speaker, himself, not against others at his urg-
ing. Thus the incitement-to-riot exception cannot apply to a hos-
tile (even violent) reaction by those who simply oppose the 
speaker's views. More specifically, a police officer's perception that 
there is a clear and present danger of violent disorder does not by 
105. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 69 lli.2d 605, 608, 373 
N.E.2d 21, 24 (1978). In his dissent to the denial of certiorari, Justice Blackmun came close 
to indicating that he would hold on the merits for Skokie, on the basis of such a likely 
eventuality. There was evidence of a "potentially explosive and dangerous situation, in-
flamed by unforgettable recollections," into which the Nazis would deliberately come, 
"taunting and overwhelmingly offensive." At the very least, it is clear from this that Justice 
Blackmun would be receptive to argUDlents so framed. 439 U.S. 916, 918 (1978). For further 
discussion of this issue, see Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COL. L. REv. 
1227, 1265 (1979). 
106. If uniformed Nazis stormed a synagogue during services, shouting "heil Hitler," 
the situation would obviously be different. The example is Neier's, see supra note SO, at 141. 
107. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 69 lli.2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 
21, 25-26 (1978). 
108. Discusson of these four words is plentiful. See J. ELy, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
107-08 (1980); Linde, Clear and Present Danger Reexamined, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1970); 
Nathanson, The Communist Trial and the Clear-and-Present-Danger Test, 63 HARv. L. 
REv. 1167 (1950); Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct And the First Amendment, 70 
CAL. L. REv. 1159 (1982). There is no scarcity of discussions of the 8ubject in the United 
States Reports, either. See, e.g., Nebraska Press v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976) (apply-
ing a somewhat differently articulated clear and present danger test); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444 (1969); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). 
109. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Although the clear and present 
danger exception is frequently abbreviated to those four words, the meaning of Justice 
Holmes' formulation is lost if the remainder of the test is overlooked: "[D]anger of substan-
tive evils that Congress has a right to prevent" may not constitute a bright line, but it 
makes clear the limited nature of the exception, as the word "danger" does not. [d. at 52. 
110. Mere advocacy of abstractions is not actionable. See Yates v. United States, 354 
U.S. 298 (1957). 
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itself allow him to intercede; he can step in only when the 
speaker's exhortations suggest the very violence to be per-
formed-not merely that the visceral reaction of the audience gives 
rise to the disorder. To treat speech any differently would render it 
subject to the "heckler's veto," thereby making legitimate but un-
popular expression (for example, advocacy of busing to achieve ra-
cial integration) legally suppressible.1ll While freedom of the press 
may belong to those who own the presses, freedom of speech is 
more nobly universal; it must not depend upon a speaker's supe-
rior command of force. 
The above-mentioned exceptions are all context-based. That is, 
what the speaker actually says is not directly at issue, but because 
of the circumstances in which the speech is made it may be pun-
ished or, (in rarer circumstances) prevented.m Thus it would be 
hard to characterize as fighting words utterances that are spoken 
with a disarming smile.u8 Likewise, advocacy of (even imminent) 
lawless action is probably protected,ll4 if there is no receptive au-
111. Unfortunately, the application of this distinction has been difficult. In Feiner v. 
New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), the Supreme Court went through a tortuous causal analysis 
to justify a speaker's arrest. Feiner had taken to a street comer in Syracuse to voice his 
displeasure with what he perceived to be racist policies in the city government. An onlooker 
threatened to attack him if the police officer present did not intenupt the discourse. The 
officer responded by &nesting Feiner for a breach of the peace. His subsequent conviction 
was upheld by two New York appellate courts, and the Supreme Court affirmed. See gener-
ally 'I'RmE, supra note 25, at 622-25. Note, Free Speech and the Hostile Audience, 26 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 489 (1951). 
112. While law that prohibits certain types of expression may be said to chill the 
rights themselves, through the prospect of punishment for violation, a prior restraint in the 
form of an injunction effectively freezes them. Where fully protected speech is at issue, (see 
infra text accompanying notes 137-48), virtually no prior restraints will ever be issued ex-
cept in the context of a judicial "gag order" (which itself is subject to a heavy presumption 
of unconstitutionality). The rationale militating against prior restraints under the above 
mentioned exceptions is that a danger cannot be clear or present until the words in question 
are uttered-and that words still unspoken cannot be considered to be provocative of vio-
lence. Cases involving prior restraints have been limited to those involving national security, 
see, e.g., United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, mandamus denied sub nom. 
Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709 (1979); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 699 (1931) (dic-
tum); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716 (1971) (Douglas, J., concuning), 
preservation of fairness of criminal trails, see e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) 
(dictum), and obscenity. See, e.g., Kingsly Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). But 
see Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). It appears that only the most serious of 
highly probable dangers will justify a prior restraint of protected speech. 
113. Chaplinaky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). 
114. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (disorderly conduct charges disfavored 
as a means of abridging speech). Ct. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (criminal 
syndicalism statute fatally overbroad). These cunent cases impose a stricter standard upon 
the government than did the earlier line in which the danger exception was first developed. 
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 
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dience being spurred on. And, listeners need not always be "cap-
tive" to the speaker; if they can reasonably anticipate what they 
will hear, the speech cannot be suppressed.11II . 
The Supreme Court has ruled that speech may be subjected to 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions,1I8 so long as they 
are neither too broad nor permit administrative discretion which 
could become in effect a veto power.1l7 Although the content of the 
proposed speech cannot be a factor in the decision whether to issue 
a permit,118 a speaker may constitutionally be punished if the con-
text in which he speaks violates reasonable regulations, duly au-
thorized and implemented. lIB 
The Skokie ordinance by which the municipal government 
sought to prevent the Nazi parade was indeed a regulation accord-
ing to time, place, and manner, 120 but it amounted to putting the 
entire community off-limits to the Nazis forever. Thus it fell far 
outside permissible standards of restraints.12l In fact, what the 
(1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). So-called subversive association and ex-
pre88ion now requires the elements of imminency and likely success. See M. SHAPIRO, F'RBB-
DOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 55 (1966). 
115. The captive audience doctrine relates to expectations of privacy, as well as sur-
prise. See Note, "Offensive Speech" and the First Amendment, 53 B.U.L. REv. 834, 847 
(1973) (disCU88ing Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972»; N. DORSBN, P. BENDER, B. 
NEUBoRN, I POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 627 (4th ed. 1976). . 
116. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
117. Permissible time, place, and manner restrictions may include a permit require-
ment for public parades and demonstrations. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 
(1941), which provided that such permits are not allocated in a discriminatory fashion. 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). For the speech to have first amendment 
protection it must take place in a generally recognized public forum. See, e.g., Adderley v. 
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (no constitutional right to hold protest at state penitentiary); 
Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1961 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 1; Note, A Unitary Approach of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned 
Property, 35 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1982). Similarly, handbills placed in mailboxes are not pro-
tected, United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburg Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 
(1981), and a state may prohibit writing on walls of public buildings. See Metromedia, Inc. 
v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 549-50 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
118. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939); Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 
281-82, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 36-37, IJppeal dismissed, 9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215 
N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 721,176 N.E.2d 836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
913 (1961). See Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because Of Its Content, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81 
(1978); Redish, The Content Distinction In First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 
113 (1981). 
119. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). If the Nazis marched through Skokie's resi-
dential streets with a sound truck, blasting out anti-semitic epithets, the speech could be 
interrupted and punished. 
120. See supra text accompanying note 97. 
121. See the disCU88ion in NEIER, supra note 50, at 115, where the author disCU88es the 
attempt by the mayor of Jersey City to put the city off-limits to labor organizers. Hague v. 
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village of Skokie wanted to do was to stop the Nazis because of the 
content of their symbolic speech, the diabolical purpose of which 
was to tap a vast reservoir of shock, bitterness, and moral abhor-
rence which they knew would conjure up gruesome images of the 
evils perpetrated by Nazi Germany. On one hand, Collin and his 
group fully understood that the memories of Holocaust survivors 
were indelible and excruciating, that the mere thought of a swas-
tika in America would generate horror, fear, and recrimination, 
and that the publicity value of their "threat" was substantial. On 
the other hand, the objects of their perversion, the citizens of Sko-
kie, felt that a symbolic victory over the American Nazis-an over-
whelming repudiation of the swastika-would yield some small 
measure of psychic vindication. 
Can any speech be restricted on the basis of its content? One 
need look no further than the obscenity laws to reach the answer: 
of course. A reasoned analysis of the present state of content regu-
lation suggests that, when the issue is properly framed, the type of 
situation which the Nazis threatened in Skokie may well be regu-
lated within constitutional bounds. But while such an objective is 
not inherently unconstitutional, its pursuit should be strategically 
sound. Though contextual restriction has come to be a more ac-
cepted means of regulating speech,122 in the Skokie situation the 
issue of the words themselves should have been met head on. 
B. "Theories of Free Speech" 
A persistent shibboleth in the American experience is that free 
speech gives everyone the right to speak his mind-indeed, that 
the Constitution guarantees absolute freedom of self-expression, 
and anything which restricts this right is the first step on the road 
toward tyranny.1II8 That "no law [abridging the freedom of speech] 
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
122. The disfavored nature of content-based restrictions is a universally accepted ele-
ment of American constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., Police' Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 
408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). See also Tribe, supra note 25, at 580-85, and the excellent expla-
nation by W. Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review Of The Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REv. 
107,139-48 (1982). But see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (content of speech must 
be examined to determine if it is protected by the first amendment). See also infra text 
accompanying notes 149-56. 
123. "Another such victory," said Justice Black, "and I am undone." See Beauharnais 
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267-75 (1981) (Black, J., dissenting). Unless Justice Black could 
categorize the speech at issue as other than "pure," Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Commu-
nity Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), he would have 
responded to any abridgment with this road-to-doom scenario. 
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means no law" was the position of Justices Black and Douglas.124 
In the vernacular, "it's a free country-I can say whatever I 
please." 
The very existence of the doctrines in exception-fighting words, 
clear and present danger, captive audience, and time/place/man-
ner-belies the simplistic popular understanding of free speech. 
Each of them, however, restrict speech on the basis of context, and 
the idea persists that content cannot be regulated. Mter all, speech 
is merely the verbal expression of the speaker's thoughts, beliefs, 
and opinions, and it is unarguable that in America there shall be 
absolute freedom to think what one wants. It does not, however, 
follow either legally, logically, or philosophically that one may 
openly express whatever he thinks, whenever and wherever he 
wants. 1211 
The source of this basic confusion is the familiar word "speech" 
itself. Constitutionally, speech must be understood as a term of 
art.U8 As one commentator suggests, the ordinary meaning of 
speech is both overinclusive-for example, telling military secrets 
to an enemy agent is speech which is not protected-and under-
inclusive-such as the silent wearing of an armband, which is pro-
tected as symbolic speech.u7 On the other hand, recognition that 
the first amendment protects a particular type of speech leads logi-
cally to the inquiry: what are the parameters of action and utter-
ance to be protected against abridgement? 
1. The Intent of the Framers 
Traditionally, interpretation of the Constitution begins with 
124. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717-18 (1971) (Black, J., 
concurring); W.O. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 362 (1954). 
125. See State v. Dixon, 78 Wash.2d 796, 479 P.2d 931, 938 (1971); T. JEFFERSON, LET-
TER TO JAMES MADISON, July 31, 1788, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 141 
(Dumbauld, ed. 1955) (discussing liability of publishers for false facts printed, despite free-
dom of the press, and criminal acts dictated by religious error as punishable despite free 
exercise of religion guarantee). 
126. See generally Schauer, Speech and "Speech," Obscenity and "Obscenity," 67 
GEO. L.J. 889, 906 (1979). 
127. Tinker, supra note 123. Accord Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1939) (flag 
display). See generally Alfrange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct-The Draft Card 
Burning Case, 1968 SUP. CT. REv. 1; Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1091 
(1968). Compare Sweden's law prohibiting the wearing of armbands, supra note 75 and ac-
companying text; Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 321, 362 
(1979) (racial friction generated by the wearing of buttons proclaiming "White is right" and 
"Happy Easter, Dr. King" led 6th Circuit to uphold school rule banning all buttons, even 
though this banned students from wearing button protesting the Vietnam War). 
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studying the intent of its Framers. Much has been made of 
Thomas Jefferson's libertarian perspective on free speech: that the 
best way to deal with error is to permit its correction by truth. 128 
"The bar of public reason"129 will generally provide the remedy for 
abuses occasioned by the unfettered dissemination of information. 
Only when the security and peace of society is threatened, Jeffer-
son felt, should the discussion of political, economic, and social af-
fairs be restrained.lSo James Madison, often called the architect of 
the Bill of Rights, wrote in The Federalist that freedom of speech 
(and of the press) would make possible a reasoned citizenry that 
would in turn keep the government in check. lSI 
The most recent historical scholarship concludes, however, that 
no clear "intent" underlying the First Amendment can be identi-
fied. 132 The Framers perceived the Constitution to be an instru-
ment dealing with the relationship of the state governments and 
the newly established "general government." The rights and re-
sponsibilities of individuals lay primarily in relation to state gov-
ernments, whose respective constitutions protected freedom of 
speech and press.lS3 The drafters of the Constitution carved out 
expressly designated powers of the federal government from state 
power. Not all freedoms were easily recognized. On the final day of 
the constitutional convention, for example, a provision that "the 
liberty of the Press should inviolably be observed" was proposed 
and was promptly voted down, because (said the delegates) "[i]t is 
unnecessary-the power of Congress does not extend to the 
Press."lM Eventually, the Bill of Rights was adopted-but only 
partially as an additional guarantor of liberty;lSlI primarily, it was a 
128. DOUGLAS, supra note 124, at 362 (quoting Thomas Jefferson on free speech). 
129. T. Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, March 4, lSOI, in JEFFERSON, supra note 
125, at 44. 
130. DOUGLAS, supra note 124, at 362. Justice Douglas naturally interpreted Jeffer-
son's meaning as in accord with his own 'absolutist' stance. But the argument made by the 
state in favor of any given abridgment of speech is always that social peace and security is 
being threatened. See infra text accompanying notes 171-74. 
131. Finnis, "Reason and Passion"; The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and 
Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 222, 229 (1967). 
132. See J. MAcG. BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LIBERTY 60-62 (1982); BeVier, The First 
Amendment and Political Speech; An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 
30 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978); Haiman, How Much Of Our Speech Is Free?, 2 CIV. LIB. REv. 
111, 113 (1975). 
133. BURNS, supra note 132, at 539-40. 
134. BURNS, supra note 132, at 62. 
135. JEFFERSON, supra note 125, at 140 (letter to James Madison, Dec. 20, 1787: "a bill 
of rights i8 what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or 
particular") (emphasis added). 
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bargaining chip to procure state ratification. 188 
None of this is to diminish the importance of the Bill of Rights, 
but merely to caution against expectation that understanding the 
"intent of the Framers" will resolve the question of precisely what 
they sought to protect by the first amendment. Simply put, there 
was no extensive, carefully considered debate on the subject. The 
governing principle of the American Revolution was less individual 
freedom than self-government.187 
For some constitutional scholars, it is that principle of self-gov-
ernment which sufficiently identifies the parameters of the first 
amendment: Congress is forbidden from abridging "the freedom of 
a citizen's speech ... whenever [it has anything to do with] the 
governing of the nation. "188 The governing function is interpreted 
broadly, to include political, economic, and social issues.188 Put 
more succinctly, the first amendment encompasses "the free and 
robust exchange of ideas and political debate."140 The federal sys-
tem of checks and balances, together with state-federal divisions of 
authority, was devised to prevent government from presenting an 
unlimited (more easily tyrannical) front against the people.141 Sim-
ilarly, the various guarantees of the Bill of Rights effectively pre-
vent a "tyranny of opinion" from being concentrated in anyone 
institution or person, and serve to ensure social, political, and reli-
gious pluralism. It is thus virtually impossible for popular self-gov-
ernment to be defeated by consolidation of control. 141 To say that 
government was perceived by the Framers as a necessary evip48 is 
probably less accurate than to suggest that the Constitution was 
drafted in such a way that made the cooperation of competing in-
terests the price for protecting the liberty of each.144 In short, the 
136. BURNS, supra note 132, at 542-43. 
137. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 264. 
138. Id. at 256. See also BeVier, supra note 132. 
139. Meiklejohn, supra note 137, at 255. To Meiklejohn the goal appears to be the 
acquisition by voters of "intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the 
general welfare"-a weighty purpose indeed for speech to play. See also Meiklejohn, The 
First Amendment And The Evils That Congress Has A Right To Prevent, 26 IND. L.J. 477, 
488 (1951). 
140. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973). See also Finnis, supra note 131, at 
238. 
141. BURNS, supra note 132, at 60-61. 
142. Id. 
143. See P. USTINOV, My RUSSIA 204, 209 (1983). 
144. If the intent of the Framers is basic to delineating the scope of the free speech 
guarantee, this provides one of the strongest arguments against protecting racial defama-
tion. Such group libel deliberately exacerbates group tensions, playing negatively upon the 
heterogeneous character of American society. The stirring up of racial or ethnic "fears, hate, 
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guarantee of free speech was one of the ways by which to enable 
expression of the will of the citizens in the representative govern-
ment established by the Revolution and Constitution. Hli 
Thus, the narrowest historical interpretation of the free speech 
clause would limit its protection to speech with political content. H8 
(The Supreme Court's willingness to protect the wearing of a jack-
et with offensive words lettered on it147 or black armbands in 
school can be explained by the political nature of resistance to the 
unpopular war in Vietnam.)H8 The broadest interpretation of the 
first amendment has come from those who find an absolutist intent 
on the part of the Framers. The Supreme Court has, however, 
adopted neither extreme. Instead, it has identified political speech 
as merely the central value to be protected. Such evaluation logi-
cally requires consideration of content: that is, what the speaker 
guilt and greed," D. BELL, RACISM IN AMERICAN LAW 59 (1973), is fundamentally opposed to 
the Framer's intent to ensure cooperative social pluralism. Insofar as differences of opinion 
are protected by the first amendment, the tenor of debate may be anywhere between polite 
and bitterly caustic. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). But racial defa-
mation is essentially different. By casting contempt on a group on the basis of race or 
ethnicity, the goal is not to participate in debate founded on the principle of pluralism, but 
to destroy it. In this sense, racial defamation is subversive speech. Unlike political extrem-
ism, in which, (however distorted its form) the Framers' principle of self-government is evi-
dent, the principle underlying racial defamation is pure discrimination. Invidious racial and 
ethnic discrimination has been rejected as anthithetical to American national policy, See 
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 2017 (1983). The positive intent of the framers 
to found a nation based on pluralism should not, therefore, be distorted to tolerate the free 
rein of vindictive attack which is unrelated, except in appearance, to any constitutional or 
national purpose. See, e.g., EpSTEIN & A. FOSTER, THE RADICAL RIGHT 40 (1967); McDOUGAL 
& CHEN, supra note 43, at 581-83, 602; Brown, Racialism and the. Rights of Nations, 21 
NOTRE DAME LAW. 1, 13 (1945); Note, supra note 115, at 854. See infra text accompanying 
notes 194-315. 
145. The free speech guarantee is thus a means to the end, not the end in itself. See 
Schauer, supra note 126, at 920 ("free speech is seen as an instrument of good, not as a good 
in itself'). See also BURNS, supra note 132, at 62: 
[d. 
Both sides [federalists and anti-federalists) invoked the Declaration of Independence 
and its call for the supreme values of liberty and equality. But what kind of liberty 
and equality? .. [T)he issue that would become the grandest question of them all-
the extent to which government should interfere with some persons' liberties in order 
to grant them and other persons more liberty and equality - this issue lay beyond 
the intellectual horizons. 
146. See, e.g., F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 13-14 (1976) (discussing freedom of 
the press). 
147. Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. 
REv. 285, 286-87. 
148. See also DORSEN & BENDER, supra note 115, at 590, for a discussion of Street v. 
New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), where a flag burning was treated as political symbolic 
speech. 
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wants to say.H9 
2. Content Evaluation in Claims for Free-Speech Protection: 
a. Theories and Results 
Judicial analysis of claims to free-speech protection generally re-
sults in one of three conclusions: (a) the act in question, such as 
political speech, is fully within the ambit of the guarantee, and 
may be regulated only according to time, place, and manner;uo (b) 
it is outside the reach of the first amendment, which does not pro-
tect every kind of expression (for example, obscenity);lU or (c) its 
content is at least tangentially within the amendment, but compet-
ing factors may outweigh the speech to such an extent that govern-
mental restrictions beyond mere time, place, and manner regula-
tion are permissible (such as "fighting words").1112 Usually, the 
competing factors in this last category are contextual-but not al-
ways. In some cases, otherwise protected content may be out-
weighed by its socially harmful nature or its minimal relationship 
to constitutionally protected, valuable speech. us 
Every first amendment/free speech case, therefore, necessarily 
presents an appellate court with a judgment to be made either on 
its content or the context in which it has been (or will be) uttered, 
or both. Category (c) has often functioned as a catchall-covering 
as it does everything from commercial speech to soft-core pornog-
raphy-and has most given rise to the murky waters of first 
149. The motivation behind particular protected speech as a basis for regulation can-
not be questioned. Ct. Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 138 
(1961) (protected speech aimed at elimination of competition did not violate antitrust laws); 
Henrico Prof. Firefighters Assoc., Local 1508 v. Board of Supervisors, 649 F.2d 237, 245 n.12 
(1981) (speaker's motivation irrelevant to first amendment analysis). Any analysis of a 
speaker's motivation would necessarily scrutinize both the sincerity of his belief in certain 
ideas and his reasons for expressing them. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 
50, 64-66 (1975); Finnis, supra note 131, at 222-23. 
150. See DORSEN & BENDER, supra note 148, at 513-14; Finnis, supra note 131, at 237. 
151. Schauer, supra note 126, at 911, 914. 
152. Schauer, supra note 147, at 305. 
153. The 1982 case of New York v. Ferber, illustrates the latter result, restriction 
purely on the basis of content. The Supreme Court construed a New York statute prohibit-
ing the distribution of non-obscene material in which a minor was depicted engaged in sex-
ual activity. Although the material was described as "child pornography," the defendant was 
not prosecuted under the obscenity portion of the statute (which also prohibited the distri-
bution of such material.) Because of the harmful nature of the material, and its minimal 
social value, the Court upheld the conviction irrespective of whether the expression was 
obscene or not. 102 S.Ct. 3348 (1982). 
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amendment analysis. 1M 
Ultimately the more realistic assessment of Supreme Court 
treatment of the speech guarantee-and the most accurate predic-
tion of future holdings-is not found in any of the free-speech the-
ories offered by the courts and commentators. The Supreme Court, 
fundamentally, is result-oriented. All within constitutional bounds, 
it will consider the interest of the speaker in his expression, the 
state in its regulation, and the public in its right to know and to be 
free of harassment. l611 The plethora of first amendment analy-
ses-the various tests, doctrines, and principles which many schol-
ars are fond of creating and defending-provide at best the means 
by which the Court's eventual result can be explained. 1116 
In essence, free-speech claims which are neither clearly pro-
tected nor excluded are subjected to judicial weighing, or balanc-
ing. m The methodology of this decisional process is variously de-
scribed in first amendment jurisprudence. The "preferred 
position" approach, for example, gives a presumptive weight to the 
right of free speech.lli8 The burden to overcome that presumption 
154. That is, legal analysis-as distinct from factual conclusions about speech. 
155. David Riesman sets forth the parameters of the task with a precision that lays 
bare the challenge of this area of constitutional jurisprudence: "What individuals . . . and 
what groups . . . should be protected against what sorts of statements, and by what legal 
mechanism-and how at the same time can one protect legitimate social criticism and the 
give and take of democratic policy, and avoid prejudiced application of the law?" Riesman, 
Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 727, 733-34 (1942). 
156. Defamation provides one of the clearest examples of the inability of theorists to 
agree on a controlling principle neceSBitating that result. Since it is closely related to politi-
cal speech (the central first amendment value), defamation of public officials and public 
figures is protected (in the absence of actual malice). New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964). See Meiklejohn, supra note 137, at 259. Where a plaintiff is libelled, the states 
may hold the speaker to a much lower standard of fault. See Comment, The Constitutional 
Law of Defamation: Are All Speakers Protected Equally?, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 166 (1983). 
Some commentators indicate that malicious public defamation and private libel are unpro-
tected (category b) because they lack constitutional value; others insist the speech is pro-
tected, but easily outweighed by the competing public interest in reputation (category c). 
See, e.g., DORSEN & BENDER supra note 148, at 514; SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 157-59; 
Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Sci-
ence Theory, 64 VA. L. REv. 1123, 1200 (1978). RegardleSB of the jurisprudence theory, the 
result remains the same-and no more clearly understood for the philosophical debate. 
157. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, supra note 139, at 484-85; Schauer, supra note 126, at 906. 
158. The "preferred position" doctrine found its first official expression in Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945), where prior restraint on a speech by a labor organizer 
was held to impare the rights of workers who had gathered to hear him. Justice Rutledge, 
speaking for the majority, stated that the Court had the duty to say where an individual's 
freedom ends and the State's power begins: "Choice on that border now as always delicate, 
is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the 
preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms 
secured by the First Amendment." 
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is substantial: in the absence of a showing of clear and present 
danger, or grave abuse to public interests, the right of unfettered 
speech is deemed paramount.U9 According to some commentators, 
the preferred position doctrine merely distinguishes thought and 
action;180 verbal expression of thought is protected, active expres-
sion is not.181 
Others take the right further, interpreting it as one not merely 
preferring speech, but as a right of free expressionl82-even a right 
to be left alone.18a Such characterizations often butt up against one 
another. In 1938, for example, a New York State court protected 
the "free expression" of one who showered a Jewish neighborhood 
with anti-semitic leaflets. Without pause or traditional analysis, 
the judge spoke of liberty, democracy, and free speech as one run-
on doctrine. uu (If the burden to overcome the preferred position of 
Although the Supreme Court occaaionally disclaims the existence of their hierarchy 
among the fundamental freedoms it recognizes first amendment liberties have enjoyed a 
favored position relative to the other guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights. The first 
amendment has been said to embody "the indispensable condition, of nearly every other 
form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). The language itself re-
flects the emphasis that the Framers placed on the fundamental freedoms. See Gard, The 
Absoluteness of the First Amendment, 58 NEB. L. REv. 1053, 1074 (1979) and, for an inter-
esting historical analysis, Calm, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L. J. 464 
(1956). These were certainly a driving force behind the American Revolution-perhaps the 
main reason that the first federation was so weak. See A. KEu.y & W.lLuunsON, THE AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTION 95-96 (5th ed. 1976). Protection of free expression has long spurred one 
of the Supreme Court's more activist roles. The concept of a limited governnlent came to be 
diluted by commerce clause litigation, see E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 103 S.Ct. 1054 (1983), 
Wichard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. III (1942); and passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, see 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
The federal judiciary came to perceive its own obligation to protect individual rights against 
governnlental infringement: thus the incorporation of the First Amendment, making it ap-
plicable to the states as well as the federal governnlent. See J. CHOPEK, JUDICIAL REvrEw AND 
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1981); R. ROTuNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 374-83 
(1981). 
159. To say "free speech" occupies the preferred position is broader than the language 
used in Thomas v. Collins, supra note 158. The Court spoke of the burden on restraint of 
"orderly discussion and persuasion." 323 U.S. at 530. In the setting of Skokie, each one of 
these terms could be argued as inapplicable. If orderly, it was only superficially so. And 
neither discussion nor persuasion characterized the Nazis' speech. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 284-90, 303-07. 
160. SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 71. 
161. [d. at 55-57. 
162. HainJan, supra note 132, at 124. 
163. See, e.g., HainJan, supra note 132, at 113 (discussing Thomas Emerson's "full 
protection" theory); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1205, 1208 (1976). 
164. People v. Downer, 6 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1938). The Court concluded with the "hope 
that this defendant will soon relieve himself of the bitterness in his heart and help to spread 
good will towards all .... " [d. at 568. 
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speech is heavy, it must be overwhelming to outweigh "liberty" 
itself!)186 
Still another approach was typified by the late Justice Frank-
furter. He rejected the preferred position as overly rigid, choosing 
instead to weigh the specific interests before the court.188 Such "ad 
hoc balancing" can succeed in identifying rival or reciprocal inter-
ests,187 but it can leave speech vulnerable.188 The state can usually 
offer a strong rationale for regulation in any particular case. 
A more protective alternative is "definitional balancing."18B 
Types of speech, not individual cases, are balanced against free-
speech interests. Defamation, for example, as a defined type of 
speech170 would be held unprotected. 
All of the formulas-preferred position, free expression, ad hoc 
or definitional balancing-attempt to formulate a methodology by 
which courts may proceed to adjust the interests before them. Re-
g~dless of the doctrine, however, those interests remain basically 
the same. 
The state's position is usually akin to the proposition enunciated 
by the Supreme Court in Cox v. New Hampshire171 that civilliber-
ties presuppose the existence of ordered liberty.172 The challenged 
speech is said to threaten such order either directly (as through a 
breach of the peace) or indirectly (as through an injury to reputa-
tion, privacy, or some other right).178 It is argued, however, that 
165. See Schauer, supra note 126, at 910-15 (rejecting the position "that freedom of 
speech is mainly an undistinguishable subset of a broader notion of individual liberty"). 
166. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See SHA-
PIRO, supra note 114, at 89-90; Schauer, supra note 126, at 904. 
167. See SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 101. 
168. SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 102. See also Nimmer, The Right To Speak From 
Time to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied To Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 
CAL. L. REv. 935, 938-41 (1968). 
169. Nimmer, supra note 168, at 942-48. 
170. [d. at 933. Not only would the state's interest in protecting individual reputations 
suffer if defamation were freely allowed, but the free-speech interest itself would be under-
mined by the spectre of "reputation assasins" able to verbally assault whomever they chose. 
[d. 
171. 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
172. The statement, frequently quoted, reads: "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the 
Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without 
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses." [d. at 574. 
173. State criminal libel 8tatutes embody the dual state interests underlying the 
claimed need to regular speech. Although often treated as a legal anachronism, it has not 
completely disappeared. See, e.g., U.S. v. Handler, 383 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Md. 1974); Gott-
schalk v. Alaska, 575 P.2d 289 (1978). 
See generally Note, Constitutionality Of The Law Of Criminal Libel, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 
521 (1952). See also Note, Defamation Of A Group, 21 NOTRE DAME LAW. 21 (1945) (crimi-
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the threat of deleterious effect need not constitutionally be toler-
ated; "the Constitution is not a suicide pact. "l'74 
In contradistinction to the state's claims on behalf of regulation 
are the interests of free speech. Even under ad hoc balancing, 
courts look less to the individual speaker's right to deliver his mes-
sage than to the people's interest in the free flow of information, 
and to the greater risk to liberty of establishing pre~edents for fu-
ture suppression of constitutionally valuable speech.I'711 
At least one commentator has suggested that a major refinement 
of free-speech doctrine is taking place, a kind of codification of the 
first amendment. l7S According to this theory the Supreme Court 
has come to treat the amendment as a constitutional umbrella 
under which a great variety of communicative activity and govern-
mental interests are adjusted. Rather than treating speech broadly 
as either protected or not,177 narrow categories are identified by 
the Court, which then applies a balancing type of analysis.178 In-
nal libel may provide source of liability for defamation of group). But see Riesman, supra 
note 155, at 745 (concluding that criminal libel and breach of the peace are "clumsy weap-
ons for ... intricate social regulation"). By precisely articulating its interest, the state is 
more likely to succeBBfully defend any 888erted regulation over speech. 
174. Kennedy v. Mendoza·Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1963). 
175. Identifying the competing interests, labelling them distinctively, and 888igning 
appropriate weight to each is the stuff of which first amendment articles, books and court 
opinions are made. In the latter, a result-orientation to the facts presented will clarify what 
the court says it is doing in its Constitutional analysis. Compare Dennis v. United States, 
341 U.S. 494 (1951) (height of McCarthy era) with Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 
(1957) (McCarthyism discredited). 
176. Schauer, supra note 147. The concept of specialized communicative categories 
seems foreshadowed in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 
77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
177. The landmark case Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), identified 
types of speech considered to be outside of the protection of the First Amendment regard-
leBB of the context in which uttered: profanity, obscenity, libel, epithets, personal abuse. 
Although diverse in nature, they were alike in being marginal to the "market-place of 
ideas." See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Hoimes, J., diBBenting). 
Apart from these categories, limitations based on content were examined carefully, to ensure 
that they did not restrict content under the guise of regulating time/place/manner of deliv-
ery, or (where clear and present danger or a fighting wordslbreach of the peace was alleged) 
to determine that the facts were as grave as claimed by the state. 
178. Schauer, supra note 147, at 313. Schauer lists the narrow categories identified 
through Ferber, each with "its own corpus of sub-rules, principles, categories, qualifications, 
and exceptions." [d. at 308-09. The advantage to narrow categories of speech is that courts 
need not protect marginal speech on the ground that state regulation might allow infringe-
ment of non-marginal speech. [d. at 287. (He notes also the disadvantage, namely, that ap-
plying different analyses to categories of speech may be too difficult for prosecutors and 
courts. [d. at 288.) Cases involving Jehovah's WitneBSes, Brandenburg and the Klan, Cohen, 
and Frank Collins are examples of protected marginal speech. [d. at 286-87. However, Jeho-
vah's WitneBBes present the affirmative guarantee of free exercise of religion, as well as the 
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deed at least one Justice, Stevens, already posits a hierarchy of 
speech. The greatest protection (in content and context) is given to 
speech nearest the pinnacle: political discussion and debate. 
The analytic approach taken in recent speech cases appears to 
conform substantially to the hierarchy model, although it has not 
been formally adopted by the Supreme Court.179 Most importantly 
for analytic purposes, the result reached by the Court is more or 
less accurately described by these models (whether they are de-
scribed as a hierarchy or a codification). Nonetheless, the likeli-
hood remains that the Court first decides the result which it thinks 
is fair, and then explains that result as a consideration of the cate-
gory of speech involved, the value of the particular utterances, and 
the proffered state justification for punishing or proscribing the 
speech.180 
b. Hard-core Pornography: What Free Speech is Not About 
Regardless of the theory applied, it is indisputable that on the 
constitutional spectrum of verbal expression political discussion 
occupies one extreme-only the most compelling proof of contex-
tual danger will justify its regulation. At the other end may be 
hard-core pornography. The Supreme Court will not allow hard-
speech guarantee, competing against state interests in regulation. Cohen's speech was politi-
cal protest. They are distinguishable from Collins and Brandenburg: if marginal, there is at 
least a colorable claim to first amendment protection. Codification not only obviates the 
dilemma of protecting marginal speech. It also increases protection to constitutionally valu-
able speech; that which is deemed dangerous or worthless can more easily be identified. 
Since this conclusion is made in terms of the narrow category within which the speech falls, 
the elements (danger, worthlessness) are less likely to be diluted. Id. at 315. See also J. ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 115-16 (1980); Schauer, supra note 126 at 908. 
179. In New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982), Justice Stevens expressed his view 
that the decision in effect adopted his approach, since the statute prohibited some protected 
activity, as well as the unprotected. Because the basis for the Court's decision was that the 
evils to be restricted overwhelmingly outweighed the expressive interest, if any, id. at 3358, 
Justice Stevens indicated that child pornography involved belonged where the Court put it, 
"in its rightful place near the bottom" of the speech hierarchy. Id. at 3367 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
180. For example, the Court has protected "speech that matters." Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). Likewise, in Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 
49 (1973), Chief Justice Burger identified legitimate state interests as "stemming the tide of 
commercialized obscenity . . . [,] the interests of the public in the quality of life and the 
total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, 
the public safety itself[,] ... [a] right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent 
society." Id. at 57-60. The Court then balanced these interests against the content of the 
communication and any privacy interests implicated. See also Garvey, supra note 127, at 
364 (as to children, state's interest in teaching "its future citizens" things other than racial 
bigotry may outweight free-speech right). 
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core pornographic speech past the doors of the home, where the 
greatest privacy interest remains virtually inviolate.181 With that 
sole contextual exception, hard-core pornography is not considered 
speech for first amendment purposes,182 and is therefore subject to 
regulation purely on content alone. Indeed, the reasoning which 
underlies the Court's exclusion of this category from first amend-
ment protection serves to clarify the meaning of constitutional 
speech (as distinct from the popular perception of speech) and ap-
pears to fit well within the codification theory. 
Despite the free-speech clause of the Bill or Rights, obscenity 
may be abridged by governmental action because in essence it is a 
physical stimulus cast in the form of verbal expression.18s Likewise, 
hard-core pornography is not talk about sex but a sexual surrogate, 
intended to evoke sexual stimulation or gratification. l84 It pos-
sesses so few of the mental attributes characteristic of the intellec-
tual/emotional/communicative process which the constitutional in-
terest in speech protects, that the first amendment is simply 
inapplicable. 1811 The particular interaction of speaker/publisher 
with listener/viewer is not the process which the speech clause was 
designed to enhance.186 
Those who wish to assert their right to be able to choose for 
themselves what they see-people who, for example, enjoy erot-
ica-may pursue other legal theories such as the right to privacy. 
In short, the 'first amendment does not protect every conceivable 
use of language (nor every form of self-expression), but only the 
"communication of ideas" in the broad sense of self-expression di-
rected toward the intellectual/emotional faculties.187 Advocacy of 
sex is within the purview of the first amendment; sex itself, by act 
or verbal surrogate, is not. Advocacy of revolution is protected 
speech; acts of revolution are not.188 The fact that every action 
181. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
182. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
183. This analysis is based on Schauer, supra note 128. 
184. [d. at 922. 
185. [d. at 923. 
186. [d. at 918-19. Since Schauer rejects individualism as the basic free speech value, 
he posits that there must be "some particular value in what is conveyed" in order to justify 
protecting it under the First Amendment. [d. at 919. Logically, he concludes, "[ilf there is a 
category of utterance that, as a whole, has no value in the context of the justifications un-
derlying the first amendment, and if this category can be adequately identified, then such a 
category ought not to be within the scope of the first amendment." [d. 
187. Schauer, supra note 126, at 923-27. See also Finnis, supra note 131, at 237-39. 
188. See Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959) 
(first amendment "protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be 
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may carry with it an implied advocacy does not bring all conduct 
within the scope of free speech. 189 
By this analysis, the seemingly arbitrary line drawn around the 
first amendment in the older cases need not be arbitrary at all.190 
Where there is no "exposition of ideas" or "communication of 
opinion,"191 there is no reason why the speech itself-simply be-
cause an epithet was thrown instead of a punch, or a movie viewed 
instead of a live sex show-must be tolerated as a matter of consti-
tutionallaw.192 
Because it so clearly typifies nonspeech, hard-core pornography 
offers a control against which other forms of verbal expression may 
be constitutionally compared. Arguably, the intent behind libel is 
verbal assault upon the victim, but the Court has recognized that 
discussion of public issues may be implicated where a public figure 
is the target.193 A finding of actual malice brings libel into the 
physical end of the expressive spectrum. Under a codification ap-
proach to the first amendment, private libel could be clearly cate-
gorized as nonspeech; the remedy available to an aggrieved plain-
tiff would be through the law of tort. 
C. The Untested Category: Group Libel 
Group libel is a category of speech which has seldom been tested 
at the Supreme Court level. 1H The last time a group libel statute 
proper"). By this act/advocacy distinction, Malcolm X could not be punished for saying, 
"You've got to confront the white man ... with something in your hand. And I don't mean 
a banana." 
189. Schauer, supra note 126, at 925. 
190. Professor Schauer says that "the court's decision to exclude obscenity from the 
scope of the First Amendment is not a linguistic sleight-of-hand." Schauer, supra note 126, 
at 910. See also Finnis, supra note 131, at 227. But see DORSEN & BENDER, supra note 115, 
at 570 ("a constitutional oddity"); Hainlan, supra note 132, at 127; Krallenmaker & Powell, 
supra note 156, at 1201. 
191. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
192. The decision in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), proves the rule. Though 
the language on Cohen's jacket was vulgar, it could be viewed as an essential part of the 
political message of opp08ition to the Vietnam War and, accordingly, protected speech. See 
also DORSEN & BENDER, supra note 115, at 626 ("Offensiveness may also be deemed to be 
more often related to political expression than is eroticism"). But see Haiman, supra note 
132, at 856. 
193. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982). See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
194. The Skokie case was not a true test since, as pointed out earlier, the legal basis 
for the town's position was context-not content:-based restriction of the Nazis' speech. 
Moreover, the fact that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Skokie does not constitute a 
decision on the merits, and has no formal precedential value. Darr v. Burfoed, 339 U.S. 200, 
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came before the Court was in 1952, in Beauharnais v. Illinois.186 
The case involved prosecution of a white supremacist under a state 
law prohibiting any publication which exposed citizens to the 
traditional injuries of defamation (contempt, derision, obloquy) by 
casting aspersions on their race, color, creed, or religion.l9S Against 
challenges that the statute violated the free speech and due pro-
cess guarantees of the first and fourteenth amendments, and was 
overly vague, the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality by a 
five to four split. 
For analytic purposes, the dissents in Beauharnais remain as 
significant as Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the majority. Jus-
tice Reed assumed the power of the state to pass group libel laws, 
dissenting on the grounds that the statute in question was too 
vague.19? Justice Jackson agreed that group libel laws would be 
within the power of the states (though not the federal govern-
ment),198 he dissented because the trial judge had offered the de-
fendant no opportunity to prove a defense (fair comment, truth, 
privilege),199 and because there had been no showing of a clear and 
present danger.2oo Justice Douglas suggested that defamatory con-
duct "directed at a race or group in this country could be made an 
indictable offense," since "[l]ike picketing, it would be free speech 
plus,"201 although he would require either a conspiracy or clear and 
present danger to support an indictment.2oll Only Justice Black 
considered the defendant's activity-as petitioning for a redress of 
grievances, a discussion of public issues, and merely the expression 
226 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
195. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
196. The statute read: 
It shall be unlawful . . . to manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, 
present or exhibit in any public place in this state [any publication) which ... por-
trays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any 
race, color, creed, or religion which ... exposes the citizens ... to contempt, deri-
sion, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots. . . ." 
Id. at 251, citing ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, Div. I, § 471 (1949). Ct. the Swedish statute, supra 
note 76 and accompanying text. Other states have attempted similar statutes with varying 
success. See, e.g., House Bill 1018 (Crimes and Punishments-Group Defamation), State of 
Maryland (1982), the constitutionality of which was challenged at 67 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 
(March 18, 1982). See also intra notes 207-232 and accompanying test. 
197. 343 U.S. at 277-84. 
198. Id. at 287-95. 
199. Id. at 295-301. 
200. la. at 302-05. 
201. Id. at 284 ("Hitler and his Nazis showed how evil a conspiracy could be which 
was ainled at destroying a race by exposing it to contempt, derision, and obloquy".). 
202. Id. at 285. 
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of views favoring segregation-to be fully protected by the first 
amendment. lOS 
Eight of the nine justices, therefore, indicated that group libel 
laws could constitutionally be enacted. Although the law means 
whatever the Court sitting at any given time says it means, there 
are sound reasons to believe that a properly drafted statute 
prohibiting defamation of a group on the basis of race, color, or 
ethnic group would pass constitutional muster. 1M First, Beauhar-
nais has never been overruled;IIOIl to the contrary, it continues to be 
cited by the Court with favor. Second, the Chaplinsky conceptual 
framework on which Beauharnais was grounded continues to be 
the starting point for first amendment analysis. lIoe Third, it can 
well be argued that racial defamation is a form of verbal utterance 
that is either constitutionally nonspeech (akin to hardcore pornog-
raphy) or, like child pornography, so near the bottom of the hierar-
chy of protection as to justify state proscription and/or civil 
liability. 
203. [d. at 267-75. 
204. Joseph Tanenhaus devotes a major portion of his article, Group Libel, 35 COR-
NELL L. REv. 261 (1950), to the form and substance a constitutional group libel statute 
should take. He examines critically various state and municipal laws, together with any judi-
cial reaction (though failure to utilize the laws in most cases resulted in an absence of inter-
pretation). Several conclusions emerge: (1) there must be well-defined or accustomed usage 
in order to save a statute from being struck down as overly vague; (2) the proscribed content 
must be clearly defined so that protected speech would not be swept within the ambit of the 
statute; (3) the proscribed content must correspond to the justification by which it is outside 
of the first amendment protection. Tanenhaus concludes that in the United States, the 
closer a group defamation statute comes to the traditional law of defamation, the greater its 
chances of being upheld. [d. at 281. In fact, Beauharnais was upheld on precisely those 
grounds. Justice Frankfurter surveys the law of libel in an extensive footnote, including the 
minor variations in dift'erent jurisdictions by statute, at common law and under the RB-
STATEMENT OF TORTS. 343 U.S. at 255-57 n.4. He then concludes that criminal libel "has 
been defined, limited, and constitutionally recognized time out of mind." [d. at 258, 264. 
Justice Frankfurter also noted that "the rubric 'race, color, creed or religion' has attained 
[al fixed meaning." [d. at 263 n.18. See also Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 698 (N.D. Ill. 
1978). Compare Sweden's anti-defamation law, supra notes 74-76, and England's, found in 
1965 ch. 73, Race Relations Act, section 6 (prohibiting threatening, abusive, or insulting 
words intended and likely to stir up racial hatred). See generally SCHAUER, supra note 146, 
at 154-66, "The Requirements Of A Strictly Drawn Statute" (discussing overbreadth and 
vaguenesa); SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 140-143 (discU88ing least means, narrowly drawn 
statutes, vaguenesa, reasonablenesa). 
205. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the dissent by Justice Douglas ex-
pressly urged that Beauharnais be overruled as "a misfit in our constitutional system." [d. 
at 82 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
206. The areas of speech in Chaplinsky which have been taken into the first amend-
ment (offensive speech, libel of public officials and figures) are clearly distinguishable from 
defamation of a racial group. 
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1. Beauharnais: Still Good Law 
111 
Over the years Beauharnais has been cited in support of a vari-
ety of propositionst including the right of a group to make asser-
tions on behalf of its members;207 the importance of narrow con-
struction in a statute which might otherwise be impermissibly 
vague or overbroad;208 the equal stringency of the Bill of Rights in 
the scope of its guarantees against the states and the federal gov-
ernment;208 and the validity of social studies as evidencet even 
though they may not be absolutely conclusive or scientifically irref-
utable.210 Each of those propositions is useful in buttressing the 
argument that prohibition or punishment of racial defamation is 
constitutional. The importance of Beauharnaist howevert rests in 
its holding that libel is not protected by the first amendmentts 
guarantee of free speech. 
Justice Frankfurterts opinion addressed the issue directly: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, 
the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words. . . . It has been well ob-
served that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, 
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that 
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality.S11 
Neithert Justice Frankfurter went ont were the due process or lib-
erty clauses of the 14th amendment violated. Simply putt defama-
tion may be punished. 
Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected 
speech, it is unnecessary. . . to consider the issues behind the phrase "clear 
and present danger." Certainly no one would contend that obscene speech, 
for example, may be punished only upon a showing of such circumstances. 
Libel, as we have seen, is in the same class. us 
Beauharnais thus clearly stands for the proposition that libel is 
nonspeech. The language of the Court on this point continues to be 
207. Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 
184 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
208. Gottschalk v. Alaska, 575 P.2d 289 (Alaska 1978). 
209. E.g., First Nat'l. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n.16 (1978); Gibson 
v. Florida Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 560 n.2 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
210. E.g., Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
211. 343 U.S. 250, 255-57 (1952). 
212. 1d. at 266. 
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quoted with favor. 2la Those who question the vitality of Beauhar-
nais appear to be analytically myopic. Apropos is Mark Twain's 
comment upon reading news of his own death: "The reports . . . 
are greatly exaggerated. "lI14 
Critics of Beauharnais have suggested that its holding as to libel 
and the first amendment was overruled by New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.21& But that interpretation reads Sullivan-which was ex-
pressly limited to actions brought by public officials against critics 
of their official conduct216-much too broadly. Sullivan did not say 
that no category of speech could be given "talismanic immunity" 
from the first amendment,lI17 but rather the Court was simply 
holding that a state could not remove speech from judicial scrutiny 
merely by the label put on it. lI18 The Court has, without exception, 
ruled that obscene speech is not protected,2lS but (under Sullivan) 
it insists on looking behind the label to satisfy itself that the ex-
pression at issue is truly constitutional nonspeech. 
If only the negative implications of Sullivan were available for 
support, the continued vitality of Beauharnais as to "libelous ut-
terances" might indeed be weak. But the case for the nonspeech 
nature of private libel is strengthened by the Supreme Court's con-
tinuing reliance upon Beauharnais. In several landmark obscenity 
decisions, notably Roth v. United StatesliliO and New York v. Fer-
ber,lI21 Beauharnais is cited to support the proposition that libel is 
not constitutionally protected. In Ferber, the Sullivan holding is 
213. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); State v. John 
W., 418 A.2d 1097 (Me. 1980). 
214. Cable from Mark Twain in London to the Associated Press (1897), reprinted in 
J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 625 (15th ed. 1980). 
215. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 173, 174 
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969); United States 
v. Handler, 383 F.Supp. 1267, 1277 n.22 (D. Md. 1974); Garvey, supra note 127, at 362; 
Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 156, at 1199 n.435; Note, "Offensive Speech", supra note 
115, at 836-39. See also 67 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. (Mar. 18, 1982). 
216. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
217. [d. at 269. 
218. Finnis, supra note 131, at 238 n.l0l. 
219. Nor is insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, 
obscenity, or solicitation of legal business protected. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 276 
U.S. 254, 269 (1964). 
220. 354 US. 476 (1957) (utterly without redeeming social value). See also Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
8Cientific value). 
221. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
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expressly characterized as an exception to the Beauharnais rule.2Z2 
If the Court had wanted merely to validate the idea that certain 
words are nonspeech, it could have cited Chaplinsky. By pointing 
to Beauharnais, centering as it did on a group libel law enacted to 
address the public threat posed by racial bigotry,22S the Supreme 
Court appears to have gone further. A strong argument is indicated 
that the Court would approve a properly drawn and construed 
statute or a judicial ruling proscribing racial defamation of a 
groUp.224 
Justice Frankfurter summarily dismissed the argument that a 
clear and present danger must be proven before a speaker can be 
punished or restrained.221! Only certain kinds of speech (e.g., politi-
cal opinion) are fully protected-that is, subject only to the state's 
fundamental interest in public order. Where speech is less pro-
tected, the state's interest may extend to some other type of harm: 
decency,Z28 reputation/an psychological injury,Z28 among others, 
may constitute "substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
vent."229 Ferber uses Beauharnais to illustrate the unprotected na-
ture of libel,2so and goes on to suggest a "codifying" approach to-
ward content regulation where, "within the confines of the given 
classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs 
222. [d. at 763. 
223. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258-63 (1952). 
224. The Illinois statute in Beauhamais included defamation of religious groups as 
well as racial or ethnic groups within its prohibition. This article would limit the reach of 
group libel to racial or ethnic defamation. (England's Race Relations Act is an example of a 
narrower statute, which includes color, race, ethnic, or national origins.) Ch. 13, Sec. 6. Arti-
cle 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, General Assembly Resolution 2106 A (XX) (December 21, 1965) set forth at greater 
length forbidden group classifications (race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin). The 
authors in HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 43, indicate that, while 
anti-Semitism is not mentioned, it could fit within this broad definition; they note that anti-
Semitism has been couched in religious, racial, economic, or cultural terms. While not ex-
plicitly mentioned, the broad definition of article 1 clearly includes anti-Semitism in 
whatever guise it might assume. [d. at 588-590. Religious bigotry has also been a source of 
social strife and individual injury; however, to include religious defamation would open the 
courts to what could arguably be excessive entanglement with the free exercise of religion -
a separate, affirmative guarantee of the first amendment. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wil-
son, 343 U.S. 495, 504-06 (1952). Racial or ethnic defamation, when cast in the form of 
religious speech, can be regulated on racial/ethnic grounds. Genuine religious disagreement 
thus remains protected by both the speech and free exercise clauses. 
225. See supra text accompanying note 222. 
226. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
227. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
228. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
229. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
230. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 763 (1982). 
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the expressive interests, if any, at stake."231 Ferber itself, involving 
speech not necessarily obscene, upheld its prohibition. 
Even if Ferber did not explicitly classify group libel as constitu-
tional nonspeech, the content of group-targeted racial defamation 
may nonetheless be a sufficient basis for state regulation. Thus, in 
the Skokie-type situation, a finding of imminent public violence 
should not be required to sustain a group libel law.232 
The constitutionality of laws proscribing group defamation by 
race or ethnic group appears to hinge on the response of courts to 
several fundamental questions. First, is the deleterious effect of ra-
cism so substantively evil as to justify state action to prevent or 
counteract it? Second, even if there is such a compelling state in-
terest, does the evil persist where whole groups, not individual per-
sons, are defamed? And third, is group libel properly characterized 
as speech, somewhere within the hierarchy of first amendment pro-
tection, or can it be classified as totally unprotected "nonspeech"? 
2. Racism: "The Evil to be Restricted" 
Throughout American-and world-history, racism has fostered 
the occasion for strife, violence, and misunderstanding.233 In its in-
stitutionalized form of slavery, racism underlay the major political 
crisis of the United States, the Civil War. As anti-semitism, it nur-
tured the single most terrifying episode of the twentieth cen-
tury-the Holocaust of Nazi Germany. It has been used to justify 
the genocide of Armenians in Turkey and Eritreans in Ethiopia. 
Racism has been called America's "intractable,"234 most "baf-
fling"23& problem. Is it so much the way of all flesh that combatting 
231. Id. at 763-64. 
232. See also Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976). To 
analogize the dictum in Young: few would march sons and daughters off to war to preserve 
the citizen's right to utter threatening, abusive, or insulting words, inciting hatred against 
the racial or ethnic group of our choice. See supra text accompanying notes 150-53. 
233. See P. USTINOV, My RUSSIA 163 (1983); Bixby, The Roosevelt Court: Democratic 
Ideology and Minority Rights, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 755 (1981); KERNER COMMISSION, NAT'L 
ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 91 (1968); Brown, Racialism and the Rights of Na-
tions, 21 NOTRE DAME LAW. I, 1 (1945). 
234. Beauharnais v. illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952). 
235. Bixby, supra note 233. See also SHAPIRO, supra note 114 at 137 ("the colored 
problem is the most complicated and bafBing of all our social problems"). Shapiro writes: 
[T)he racial question is the one issue in American life that has at various times 
proved unamenable to the normal workings of the political process . . . to become a 
conflict of principle. Conflicts of principle are, of course, the one sort of conflict that a 
liberal democracy, whose life is compromise, cannot tolerate, for it is possible to com-
promise interests but not principles. 
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it amounts to little more than a waste of social energy? 
History itself demonstrates that racism is not unassailable.28e 
Racially rooted problems can be dealt with through the law, as was 
cogently illustrated by Arthur Larson in a 1969 law review arti-
cle.287 The two extreme views-that the law is useless to change 
attitudes, and that any gain achieved is negligible-are simply con-
tradicted by hard evidence.288 Law in its legislative or judicial 
forms may be ineffective where overt racism is widespread and 
deeply rooted,28e but blatant prejudice has become somewhat 
anachronistic,UO at least in the United States. 
In the international community as well, "man's most dangerous 
myth"241 has been increasingly discredited. In 1959, following a 
rash of racist incidents in Europe and South America,u2 the 
United Nations adopted a Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination.u8 "[A]ny doctrine of racial differ-
entiation or superiority," read the statement, "is scientifically 
false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, and 
. . . there is no justification for racial discrimination, either in the-
ory or in practice."244 Not only is racism said to deny human rights 
and offend human dignity, it constitutes "an obstacle to friendly 
and peaceful relations among nations and as a fact capable of dis-
turbing peace and security among peoples."ulI In times of hardship 
Id. 
236. See generally McDOUGLAS & CHEN, supra note 43, at 602. 
237. Larson, The New Law Of Race Relations, 1969 WIS. L. REv. 470. Professor Lar-
son was, o(course, speaking of white-black relations specifically. The principles underlying 
his arguments are equally applicable to other fonne of racism. See also Beauharnais v. llli-
nois, 343 U.S. 250, 261-62 (1952); Oberg, Is Sweden Ripe For Racism?, 27 SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
SWEDEN 6 (Feb. 1983) (law and attitude-changing going together). 
238. Larson, supra note 237, at 511. 
239. Id. at 514. His specific example was the failure of prohibition. 
240. Id. See also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 2017 (1983); "Town 
Seeks Reason For Synagogue Burnings," Baltimore Sun, Oct. 3, 1983, Al, col. 5-6, at A12, 
col.4. 
241. McDOUGAL & CHEN, supra note 43, at 569. The source of the quotation is A. 
MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE (1974): "The popular cate-
gorizations of 'race ... when indulging in "man's most dangerous myth," are built upon 
vague, shifting, and erratic references.' " 
242. Id. at 585-86. 
243. Adopted November 20, 1963 by the General Assembly of the United Nations (res-
olution 1904 (XVIII». The International Convention on the Elimination of All Fonne of 
Racial Discrimination was adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General 
Assembly resolution 2106A (XX), December 21, 1965. 
244. U.N. DECLARATION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, 
PREAMm.E. 
245. Id. at art. 1. 
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or stress, outbreaks of racial hatred and violence become an ex-
pression of frustrated anger, feeding upon itself in a vicious cy-
cle. us The victimized group is identified by the attacker according 
to its race and conveniently made the scapegoat, in what has been 
called "an economy of thought."247 (Little if any intellect is neces-
sary to hurl racial epithets, paint a swastika, burn a cross, or blame 
a minority group for specific problems.)248 A "free and robust ex-
change of ideas"24& is nonexistent; and there is a total absence of 
debate by which each individual can make up his own mind, on the 
basis of all the evidence on every political-moral issue.2l10 Racial 
defamation short-circuits the democratic principle of self-govern-
ment.2111 By threatening this basic presupposition, it becomes a 
substantive evil not only to those persons directly targeted, but to 
all society. 
3. The Interrelationship of Groups and Individuals: Interest 
and Injury 
An intimate nexus exists between individuals and the groups or 
associations to which they belong. Procedurally, associations may 
assert the rights of their members.2112 At least one court, relying on 
the rationale accepted in Beauharnais, has held that individual 
246. See, e.g., G. ALLPORT, The Nature of Prejudice (1954), in BELL, supra note 144, 
at 85; ROWAN AND MAZIL, Can The Klan Come Back?, 123 READER'S DIGEST 197 (Sept. 
1983); Hard Times Trigger Racial, Religious Hate, 11 HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (1983). 
247. [d. 
248. Seymour Lipset suggested in The Sources of the Radical Right, in D. BELL, THE 
RADICAL RIGHT 289 (1963), that after World War II, anti-communist crusades became the 
vehicle for hostilities formerly directed against Jews; anti-Semitism fell into disrepute, but 
McCarthyism was riding high. Lipset's theory was correct, and once McCarthyism declined, 
racism and its anti-semitic variant again became the easy outlet, "white [Gentile) 
supremacy, cloaked in patriotism and religion." ROWAN AND MAZIL, supra note 246, at 203. 
249. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973). 
250. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1135 (1979). 
251. The danger to "ordered liberty" is not merely violent disruption of public order. 
As Professor Riesman noted, discussing Nazi Germany, the leaders utilized a more insidious 
approach, but one no less dangerous to democratic pluralism than overt violence, since they 
"aim[ed) at political and economic annihilation of groups ... and use[d) violence only inci-
dentally." Riesman, supra note 155, at 753. Both Justice Douglas, dissenting in Beauhar-
nais, and Professor Shapiro, discussing the future of the first amendment, seem not to have 
considered this subtle danger, equating it simply with overtly violent conspiracy or action: 
"something close to a new civil war." SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 158. Similarly, the F.C.C. 
in 1972 refused to ban the continued broadcasting of a white supremist candidate for the 
U.S. Senate, saying that it did not rise "above the level of public inconvenience, annoyance, 
or unrest," and that no clear and present danger was posed. See infra test accompanying 
note 318. 
252. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
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Black citizens could be injured through the defendant's libelous 
characterization of the Negro race. l1i3 Most courts, however, have 
been unable, or unwilling, to depart from the traditional theory 
that redress is available only where an individual has been in-
jured-or to recognize that defamation of a group directly injures 
its members. 
It has been suggested that libel is more important in America 
than in other Western democracies because an individual's reputa-
tion is considered akin to a property interest.IM Similarly, the role 
of the group in the American social process has been subordinated 
to the role of the individual.11I1I 
Nevertheless, America remains a great melting pot, with perhaps 
greater diversity of ethnic representation than any other place in 
the world. It has almost literally torn itself apart to effect racial 
integration. When destructive attack on a group is permitted, indi-
viduals within the ranks inescapably suffer.11I1I Where Jews or 
Blacks are defamed as a group, the speaker's target is each Jew or 
each Black. The same is true with any other racial or ethnic de-
nomination. When a neo-Nazi bemoans the fact that Hitler "didn't 
finish the job (of exterminating Jews)," he is not likely to turn to a 
Jewish person and say, "Of course, I didn't mean to include 
yoU."1II7 
As libel law has traditionally focused on the individual, psychia-
trists have been concerned primarily with the pathology of individ-
ual paranoia. It has been suggested, however, that one type of 
paranoia is the projection by one group upon another of its own 
low self-esteem. IllS In light of the conflicts, misunderstandings, acts 
253. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 
367 U.S. 1 (1961). 
254. Riesman, supra note 155, at 731. 
255. [d. The super-technical approach (legalistic in the worse sense) to the injurious 
effect of group defamation is illustrated by Rockwell v. Morris, where the New York Jewish 
War Veterans was stricken as intervenor-appellant, on the grounds that it "was not a party 
aggrieved" by Rockwell's Nazi harangues. 12 A.D.2d 272, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 38, aff'd, 10 
N.Y.2d 721, 219 N.Y.S. 2d 268 (1961). 
256. See Nimmer, supra note 168, at 949-50; Riesman, supra note 155, at 731; 
Tanenhsus, supra note 204, at 261. 
257. Professor Riesman appears to be more preoccupied with the form of the state-
ment than its substance, when he ponders whether "virulent attacks are actually libelous or 
slanderous." The example he then refers to, "If I had my way ... I would hang all the Jews 
in this country," seems clearly to be racially defamatory. It should not be necessary for 
racial defamation to take some particular form, such as an accusatory slur or epithet. Ries-
man, supra note 155, at 751 (quoting People v. Ninfo, City Magistrate's Court, 7th District, 
Borough of Manhattan, Sep. 20, 1939, Stenographer's Minutes at 9-10). 
258. Pinderhughes, Understanding Black Power: Processes and Proposals, 125 AM. J. 
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of violence, and "deaths on a massive scale" which group-paranoid 
processes have caused, "psychiatrists may come to identify them as 
the most serious pathogenic factors in our era."269 In short, injury 
to the self, between individuals, and among groups is inflicted by 
the paranoia from which racism springs, and of which racial defa-
mation is one expression. 
Private victims of defamation are more entitled to redress for 
their injuries than public figures, because they have not chosen to 
lead a public life or speak out on public issues so as to make them-
selves a target for attack.260 In addition, a private person's capacity 
for self-help is more limited.261 Persons targeted by reason of their 
racial or ethnic identity are in the same position: they have not 
chosen their ancestry, which the speaker treats less as an objective 
fact than a subjective source of disparagement.262 Individuals 
within the group are all the more vulnerable to the defamatory 
speech.26s 
Older cases suggested that the very breadth of the libel (casting 
aspersion wholesale, upon a large population of diverse individu-
PSYCHIATRY 1552-57 (1969), in BELL, supra note 144, at 89-91. 
259. Id. 
260. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974). 
261. Id. See also Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308,328 (1979). 
262. See A. Downs, Racism in America and How To Combat It, U.S. Comm'n on Civil 
Rights 5-6 (1980), in BELL, supra note 144, at 87-88 (defining racism as a form of behavior 
not subordinating a person or group, because of "color" not a scientific idea). Downs points 
out that the "color" judgment may be made by a white racist, for example, even where the 
"other" group is technically white (e.g., Mexican-Americans). Similarly, Allport describes 
the process. "An imaginative person can twist the concept of race in almost any way he 
wishes, and cause it to configurate and 'explain' his prejudices." Au,PORT, supra note 246, at 
85. See also McDOUGAL & CHEN, supra note 43, at 569 ("a race is any group of people whom 
they choose to describe as a race") (quoting A. MONTAGU, STATEMENT ON RACE 8 (1972». 
NEIER, supra note 50, at 17, indicates that in the bitter in-fighting among the various neo-
Nazi groups, Frank Collins was accused by rivals of having Jewish blood. 
263. Neier also indicates that in Naxi Germany, those persons of Jewish background 
who had converted to Christianity nevertheless were classified as Jews. The label was ap-
plied for the benefit and purposes of the attackers, rather than to reflect any scientific or 
objective fact. NEIER, supra note 50, at 26. See also McDOUGAL & CHEN, supra note 43, at 
580. Of course, the concept of race itself is at best amorphous since "[r)aces change, die, 
merge with other races, become modified by racial intermarriage .... [R)ace is manifestly 
a transitory fact." Brown, supra note 233, at 11. Recently, a Louisiana woman challenged 
her racial classification, under a state statute which labelled her legally "colored" on the 
basis of 1/32 Negro ancestry. The obviously fallacious nature of such a racial classification 
system resulted in the repeal of the law. Smart-Grosvenor, Observed With "Racial Purity", 
Ms. 28-30 (June 1983); Editor's Note, Ms. 12 (September 1983). In some families where 
negroid and caucasian genetic characteristics are present, there may be children who look 
"black," and others "white." The apparently "white" children then may make an affirmative 
self-identification of themselves as black (but probably not, vice versa.) Conversation with 
D. Bruce Hanson, Center For Community Change, Wash.; D.C. (August 27,1983). 
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als) would undercut the charges. 2M This approach presupposes a 
more rational response by the speaker's audience than experience 
with racial defamation warrants.2811 It also fails to take seriously 
the destructive nature of racism upon civilized society.288 Whether 
particular racial characterizations could be "proven true" is a 
straw issue which often plays into the hands of the defamer. 287 
When an extreme right-wing group accuses someone of being a 
"communist," for example, his denial alone is not a complete cure 
for the injury to his reputation. A Black may be in a worse position 
when subjected to the slander, "niggers are rapists"-or even to 
the milder proposition, "Blacks are genetically "inferior." Against 
the group smear, which inevitably has some partial factual basis288 
(some Blacks are convicted rapists, some have low I.Q.'s), the 
statement's deleterious effect is not so easily remedied. The "in-
tractable problem" of racism is made more so. 
The traditional arguments against the constitutionality of group 
libel laws-that there is no injury because no individual is directly 
264. Riesman, supra note 155, at 770. In People v. Edmondson, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 
(1938); the court opined that the law need not be stretched to protect against group libel. 
Abuse of freedom of speech would be effectively restrained by speakers' good taste-or, that 
failing, by awareness that defamatory attacks are self-defeating. Id. at 259. One wonders at 
what distance from reality this judge lived. See also Tanenhaus, supra note 204, 266-273 
(discussing old English and American criminal libel cases involving Jews, civil war veterans, 
Knights of Columbus); Note, Defamation of A Group, 21 NOTRE DAME LAw. 21, 22 (1945). 
265. See ALLPORT, supra note 246, at 85. See generally Riesman, Democracy and Def-
amation: Fair Game and Fair Comment I, 42 COL. L. REv. 1085 (1942) (discussing use of 
libel and slander by fascists). See infra note 316. Judicial tolerance of racial defamation, 
demonstrated in, e.g., People v. Edmondson, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 268-69 (1938) ("It is wiser to 
bear with this sort of scandal-mongering ... We must su1fer the demagogue and the charla-
tan, in order to make certain that we do not limit or restrain the honest commentator on 
public affairs") reflects a persistent allegiance to the marketplace of ideas. The hard case of 
racism, especially in its extreme form (Hitler's genocidal practices), is, however, an invaria-
ble part of marketplace discussions. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 126, at 915-16 (Slavery 
was not a wise policy, Nazism was not correct); Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 
YALE L.J. 1105, 1132 (1979). Since the deleterious effects of group-directed racism are abun-
dantly evident, the judicial conclusion that racial defamation of groups inflicts no harm 
which reasoned reflection will not cure seems illogical at best. See Nimmer, supra note 168, 
at 955, 933. 
266. Lipset, supra note 248, at 298 also indicates the long-term effect that even an 
episodic wave of hate-mongering can have on the social fabric. His illustration is the restric-
tive immigration laws passed in the early 20th century. 
267. Riesman, supra note 265, at 1089-1101 (describing European experience). 
268. See Tanenhaus, supra note 204, at 293. Tanenhaus concludes that the problem of 
"proof" is a major stumbling block to the enforcement of group libel law. But the judiciary 
is clearly capable of drawing the necessarily fine lines involved in speech claims, so the first 
amendment is not merely "an unlimited license to talk." Kongisberg v. State Bar of Cal., 
366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961). Courts should be able to address relativity and partial truth in group 
libel, as they do for individuals. 
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defamed, and that society is somehow stronger for permitting self-
expression through the intentional infliction of injurious racial at-
tacks269-are unpersuasive in the light of history, social science, 
and common sense. The issue is really whether the law is ready to 
recognize the nature and extent of the harmful effect27°-and the 
courts to accept group libel as an analytically sound basis for 
liability.271 
4. Racial Defamation as Speech 
The courts have not been oblivious to the patently offensive na-
ture of racial defamation, in that they are quick to repudiate the 
message of the speakers.272 But such repudiation is generally in 
apology for their judgment that the speech is protected by the first 
amendment. Justice Black interprets the white supremacist litera-
ture in Beauharnais as essentially the expression of political 
ideas.278 Various commentators have taken the same approach. 
One, for example, says that Nazi speech (referring specifically to 
the Skokie situation) is political in nature,274 and as such warrants 
269. See, e.g., Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 286-87 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545-46 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring); People v. 
Edmondson, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1938); DOUGLAS, supra note 124, at 363; DORSEN & BENDER, 
supra note 115, at 570; Garvey, supra note 127, at 363; Wellington, supra note 265, at 1131-
34; Note, supra note 115, at 854 (discussed from the perspective of radical black speech); 
Note, Constitutional Law-Free Speech and the Hostile Audience, 26 N.Y.U. L. REv. 489, 
498 (1951). 
270. See Burkey, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1971) in Bell, supra note 144, at 100-101; McDOUGAL & CHEN, supra note 43, at 581-83; 
Tanenhaus, supra note 204, at 278. 
271. Riesman, supra note 155, at 772. Professor Riesman recognized the speculative 
nature of damages in group libel, suggesting that the appropriate relief might be an action 
in equity for an injunction. [d. at 771-73. See also Tanenhaus, supra note 204, at 290-91 
(discussing procedural aspects). In Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), Justice 
Frankfurther indicated that whether or not racial defamation laws would solve the underly-
ing problems, states should be permitted to deal with them through "the trial-and-error 
inherent in ... efforts to deal with obstinate social issues." [d. at 262. 
272. E.g., Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 (D.C. Cir. 
1968) (Skelley-Wright, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969); Rockwell v. Morris, 
12 A.D.2d 272, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, appeal dismissed, 9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215 
N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 10 N.Y.S.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 913 (1961). 
273. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 270 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). 
274. Schauer, supra note 126, at 919. In his later article, Codifying the First Amend-
ment, Schauer seemed to modify this position suggesting that Collins' speech was not pro-
tected for its own sake-as political speech-but only as a "fortunate beneficiary" of the 
courts' desire to protect the board category of political speech. Schauer, supra note 147, at 
286-87. Under the broad-category approach to the speech clause, the marginal speech must 
be protected to ensure that genuine political speech is not abridged. Under the narrow cate-
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the highest degree of first amendment protection. Another, refer-
ring to the speakers as "extreme rightwing neo-fascists," neverthe-
less reminds his readers that "political dissent must not be 
stifled. "2711 
Other expressions of racial and ethnic bigotry are variously de-
scribed as ideas, views, or doctrines. Though not expressly labelled 
political speech, they are treated as contributions to the demo-
cratic marketplace-where, for first amendment purposes, there is 
said to be "no such thing as a false idea."276 "Government cannot 
protect the public against false doctrine," wrote Justice Jackson in 
Thomas v. Collins.277 "Each must be his own watchman for truth 
... [since] our forefathers did not trust government to separate 
truth from falsehood for us. "278 A state court once ruled that the 
speeches of George Lincoln Rockwell, former leader of the Ameri-
can Nazi Party, could not be abridged because if they were, "the 
preacher of any strange doctrine could be stopped."279 Another of-
fered the noble-sounding opinion that "[w]e must suffer the dema-
gogue and charlatan, in order to safeguard the honest commentator 
on public affairs. "280 
Racial defamation is shielded by the first amendment, the argu-
ment goes, for the same reasons that other abhorrent speech is 
protected: first, because an opinion (not necessarily the "truth") is 
best arrived at in the free exchange of discussion and persuasion;281 
gorization of speech under a first amendment umbrella of values, the implication is that 
such "beneficiaries" would lose their free ride. 
275. SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 136. 
276. Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1221, 1245 (1976) 
(quoting Justice Power in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974». This is 
the basis for Justice Douglas' dissent in Beaubarnais v. illinois, 343 U.S. at 284-87 (1952). 
See also Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1968) 
(Skelley-Wright, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969) (speech approaches the 
area of political and social commentary). The speech was anti-Zionist, but did not attack 
Jews as a religious group. Under the facts, Chief Justice Burger (then Circuit Judge) held in 
the opinion that the appeals to reason and to prejudice were impossible to separate. Id. at 
172. See infra note 321 for additional discussion of this case. 
277. 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
278. Id. at 545-46. 
279. Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 276, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 29, appeal dismissed, 9 
N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215 N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 10 N.Y.S.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219 
N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961). 
280. People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 268 (1938). 
281. E.g., Garvey, supra note 127, at 361 (value of student free speech in the search 
for truth is training for adult participation). Professor Shapiro more realistically identifies 
the outcome of the marketplace model as "the tentative conviction that there is no absolute 
truth," and its corollary, that "adjustment between rival partial truths is better ... than 
adherence to one fixed mixture of truth and falsehood." SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 53; 
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and second, because the risk to democracy from any form of "pre-
screening" far outweighs the benefit of not having to deal with un-
popular, alarming, obnoxious, or shocking ideas.282 It is thus politi-
cal prudence, not political philosophy, which underlies the freedom 
for this type of speech.283 
In so categorizing racial defamation as speech, however, the 
courts are misconstruing its form for its substance. Superficially, 
racists claim to be merely expressing legitimate thoughts on the 
relations between social groups, urban problems, politics, or 
finance-all under the cloak of patriotism.284 Racial defamation 
often looks like political speech.2811 One need scratch barely be-
neath the surface, though, to recognize that racial defamation of-
fers no ideas, opinions, or proposals-nothing of substance or 
merit. It may be more accurately perceived as linguistic abuse (ver-
bal assault on an unwilling target);286 the kind of fascism "which 
aims at political and economic annihilation of groups. . . and uses 
violence only incidentally";287 a destructive form of twisted self-
expression;288 or, most simply, scapegoating.289 Just as a physical 
assault is not protected self-expression, neither should the verbal 
assault of racial defamation be misconstrued as protected 
Schauer, supra note 126, at 915-17 (history supports proposition that population selection 
among ideas, arrives at truth more readily than governmental selection); Wellington, supra 
note 265, at 1134 (quest of democracy is formal justice and evolving truth); Note, supra note 
269, at 498 ("society's interest in the attainment of the truth through the free exchange of 
violently divergent ideas .... "). -
282. E.g., DOUGLAS, supra note 124, at 363; SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 55; Krat-
tenmaker & Powe, supra note 156, at 1213; Note, supra note 115, at 835. The adjectives are 
those of the court in Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 281-82, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 35, appeal 
dismissed, 9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162,215 N.Y.S.2d 205, aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 
836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961). 
283. SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 47. 
284. ROWAN AND MAZIL, supra note 246, at 203. 
285. See text of white racist candidate in supra note 251. 
286. Riesman uses the term "verbal sadism." See supra note 265, at 1088. See also 
Nimmer, supra note 168, at 949-50. 
287. Riesman, supra note 155, at 753. See also Riesman, supra note 265, at 1089 (ver-
bal attacks used in early stages of fascism, as an initial building and unifying anti-demo-
cratic tool, while the group is small and/or weak). 
288. The phrase is Garvey's, supra note 127, at 365. 
289. See Nimmer, supra note 168, at 949 (freedom of speech as safety valve); BELL, 
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 59 (1973); Riesman, supra note 155, at 731. (Arguably, the inter-
est is stronger, since racial targets are substantively injured-by the content-whereas the 
captive audience is harmed only by the use of the context, a lesser infringement.) There is 
some conceptual similarity between the captive audience, supra note 115, and the unwilling 
victimized group, so that protection of groups libelled racially is as significant as that of the 
captive audience. 
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speech.290 Just as hardcore pornography is not permitted "talis-
manic immunity" from judicial scrutiny,291 neither should racism 
be allowed to "demean the grand conception of the First 
Amendment. "292 
5. Racial Defamation as Nonspeech 
At the very least, racial defamation is "covered but out-
weighed".293 Indeed, in Justice Stevens' hierarchy of constitutional 
protection, it is mired very near the bottom.294 
It is difficult to envision anything about racial defamation that 
would justify its· participation in the marketplace of ideas. Citizens 
would not be impoverished by the loss of a political-moral issue 
about which each must "make up his own mind."291i All the politi-
cal, economic, social, and psychological issues of American life 
would remain to be debated. Racial defamation can be proscribed 
not as a "strange doctrine"296 or a false idea, but as a form of as-
sault, as conduct. The speech clause protects the marketplace of 
ideas, not the battleground. . 
The Supreme Court's treatment of the religion clause of the first 
amendment provides an apt analogy.297 One is absolutely guaran-
teed the freedom to believe whatever one wishes, but not the right 
in every case to translate belief into action.298 The "preacher of 
290. See Haiman, supra note 132, at 112 (discussing the position of Zechariah Chaffee, 
Jr., that some expression is "akin to a physical blow"). 
291. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). Analogously, the claim 
that allegedly obscene material has first amendment value (serious literary, educational, sci-
entific, artistic worth, advocating a position, or intending to impart information) is assessed 
by a reviewing court. The bare claim does not close the matter. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF 
OBSCENITY 36-53 (1976). Of course, attempts to camouflage the nature of racial defamation 
may not even be made. Handbills circulated by the Nazis prior to their planned demonstra-
tion in Skokie contained statements blatantly derogatory to Jews; some denied the Holo-
caust or made otherwise false representations of verifiable historical fact. Note, Group Vili-
fication Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308, 331 (1979). The white racist campaign 
advertisement was similarly overt. See supra note 251. 
292. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973). 
293. Schauer, supra note 147, at 305. 
294. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 781 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
295. Wellington, supra note 265, at 1135. 
296. Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 281-82, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 35, appeal dismissed, 
9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215 N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 10 N.Y.S.2d 721,176 N.E.2d 836, 219 
N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961). 
297. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." 
298. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). "The first is absolute but, in 
the nature of things, the second cannot be." This dual aspect was reaffirmed expressly in 
School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading in public 
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strange doctrine"299 cannot be restrained from preaching, but the 
practice of doctrine (strange or otherwise) may be regulated.aoo 
Only in total abstraction could racist ideas be freely offered in the 
democratic marketplace of speech. SOl 
As discussed earlier, pornography does not "preach sex"; it offers 
itself as a sexual surrogate-its purpose, to stimulate a response.802 
The speech clause of the first amendment does not apply to picto-
rial display so minimally cognitive and essentially physical. Analo-
gously, racial defamation does not merely "preach hate"; it is one-
way hatred practiced by the speaker, who seeks to stimulate his 
audience to a like response. sos Race is a trigger; a whole series of 
schools struck down); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing laws 
upheld). 
299. Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 281-82, N.Y.S.2d 25,35, appeal dismissed, 9 
N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215 N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 10 N.Y.S.2d 268, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219 
N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961). 
300. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
301. Whether doctrinal and practical racial hatred can be distinguished is arguable. 
The expression 'of theory of racism tends to expose the targeted group to bigotry and 
prejudice. An objective disCUBBion of the South Mrican system of apartheid would be pro-
tected by the speech clause (as it would protect the study of the Bible as literature without 
violating the Establishment Clause, School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 223-25 (1963». Even cast in its most favorable light by the official interpretations, 
apartheid is a doctrine of "separate but equal." In the United States, however, the conclu-
sion is final: forced, imposed separation is inherently unequal. Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Where the speaker becomes an advocate for apartheid, therefore, the 
impermissible line is crossed. The speech, arguably, is inherently racially defamatory. See 
also Brown, supra note 233, at 3 (1945) (distinguishing the principle of unqualified racial-
ism, from the implied racism of discriminatory and paternalistic behavior). The United Na-
tions International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, G.A. Resolution 2200A 
(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), makes "all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or ha-
tred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such 
acts against any race or group of person of another colour or ethnic origin" a punishable 
offense. Due regard is to be given to the freedom of expression principles of article 5; never-
theless, the conclusion of the International Covenant (as of this article) is that the advocacy 
of racism has no public value which, given the demonstrably harmful effects with which it is 
inextricably intertwined, would support its protection. But see Wellington, supra note 265, 
at 1131-33 (1979) (arguing that there is no such thing as a closed issue, including the issue of 
genocide); SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 135 ("we can never be sure that any statement is 
true"). 
302. See supra note 181-189 and accompanying text. 
303. See Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 276, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 29, appeal dis-
missed, 9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215 N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 
836,219 N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961), where the court acknowledged that 
"[g]roup hate and fear are stimulated and expressly intended to be stimulated in those ripe 
for it." Applying the traditional danger test, the New York court found that Rockwell must 
be given a permit to speak, as any other "preacher of any strange doctrine," unless a show-
ing of irreversible harm could be made to cut him off. [d. This is, of course, a classic contex-
tual analysis. 
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emotionally conditioned responses follow.304 The Nazi in Germany 
understood perfectly the rhetorical uses of racism.3011 Contempo-
rary hate-groups likewise manipulate the "boogie,"306 making little 
pretense toward persuasion but much toward prejudice.307 
When the state treats racial defamation as constitutional speech 
or advocacy, it distorts the relationship between government and 
individuals.308 The speech clause of the first amendment is in-
tended to protect individuals from governmental domination of 
opinion (directly, or through suppression of unpopular minority 
positions through tyranny of the majority). Are not individuals 
who are abused by reason of their race, color, or ethnicity also enti-
tIed to protection?309 When the government fails to intervene, non-
speech has succeeded in its masquerade.31o Victims can rebut by 
means of discussion and persuasion,3l1 but those are not necessa-
rily the best means to counteract nonspeech.312 
The proper analysis of racial defamation-as constitutional non-
speech-would fully permit its regulation by the state. In Skokie, 
fears were expressed that the boundary line between protected po-
litical dissent and unprotected group defamation would be impos-
304. McDOUGAL & CHEN, supra note 43, at 570. 
305. See, e.g., Bixby, supra note 233, at 753-60; Riesman, supra note 265, at 1085-89; 
Riesman, supra note 155, passim; Riesman & Glazer, The Intellectuals and the DiScon-
tented Classes, THE RADICAL RIGHT 97 (1963) ("In America, Jews and Negros divide be-
tween them the hostilities that spring from inner conflict .... In EuroPe the Jew must do 
double duty."). 
306. ALLpORT, supra note 246, at 85. 
307. See Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 289, 211 N.Y.S.2d :25, 41-44, (Eager, J., 
dissenting), appeal dismissed, 9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 1623, 215 N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 10 
N.Y. 2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913(1961); Bixby, 
supra note 233, at 758-59. 
308. Riesman, supra note 155, at 779. 
309. See SHAPIRO, supra note 114, at 136, identifying, with regard to extreme right-
wing neo-fascists, the problem of not stifling political dissent, while "thwarting their goal of 
creating situations of intergroup hatred and violence." Id. See also DORSEN & BENDER, 
supra note 115, at 570, where the Court's treatment of obscenity is attributed, in part, to 
the inherent difficulty of affirmatively proving the widespread social harms flowing from the 
speech. The conclusion applies equally to defamation of racial groups: widespread effect, 
"unsusceptible" of "proof." Id. 
310. See Nimmer, supra note 168, at 933, 955. Too much of the argument against 
racial defamation laws is bound up in rigid adherence to principle, and not enough of it 
addresses the central thesis of experience. 
311. There were certain positive aspects which emerged from the Skokie confronta-
tion. Many people were reawakened to the horrors of Nazism, especially the post-war gener-
ation. The community rallied in ecumenical fashion behind the rights of the survivors and 
against the Nazis. But these do not justify denial of government protection to the defamed 
persons in the first place. See also NEIER, supra note 80, at 7-8. 
312. Nimmer, supra note 168, at 955. 
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sible to draw, and to attempt to create one could ultimately force 
democracy to give way to totalitarianism.S13 In fact, Collin's defam-
atory taunts were protected in the name of free speech, while the 
community's interests in privacy, reputation, and social order were 
allowed to suffer. 
To suggest that the law cannot distinguish between political 
comment and racial defamationsl• is akin to equating Michelan-
gelo's nudes with the salacious depictions in a 42nd Street "por-
nography" shop. But courts undertake a rigorous scrutiny of the 
facts before offering protection in obscenity and pornography 
cases.SIIl Subtle line-drawing is also required in free-exercise-of-re-
ligion claims. The line between racial defamation and political 
comment should not be nearly so difficult. 
6. The Test 
Racial defamation occurs whenever the speaker's intention-or 
the perceived effect of the speech-is to cause ridicule or contempt 
upon a racial group. In every case intention and effect are subjec-
tive determinations fully within a court's discretion. 
For example, the following situations could give rise to a finding 
of constitutionally punishable racial defamation: 
* A radio talk show is discussing reparations for Japanese-Americans in-
terned in concentration camps in the United States following the attack on 
Pearl Harbor. A caller expresses disbelief at the very notion, telling the 
Congressman who is sponsoring the legislation (a guest on the show), "you 
obviously haven't done your homework. Do you know what those people 
did? I know .... "818 
* Prior to a planned demonstration, Nazis circulate handbills containing 
statements derogatory of Jews and claiming that the Holocaust was a 
fabrication.817 
* A political candidate issues the following statement: I am J.B. Stoner. I 
am the only candidate for U.S. Senator who is for the white people. I am 
the only candidate who is against integration. All of the other candidates 
313. The Beauharnais opinion rejects this scenario. 343 U.S. 250, 263-64 (1952). 
314. People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142,4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 268 (1938). 
315. SCHAUER, supra note 146, at 156-57. 
316. Comments made by a caller to the Fred Fisk Show, (Washington, D.C., Sept. 16, 
1983) (emphasis added). The issue of the U.S. internment policy is, of course, valuable. It 
necessarily includes exploration of the rationale put forward at the time: namely, the per-
ceived threat of the Japanese-Americans as potential fifth column. Whether the caller's 
speech constitutes genuine discussion, or mere racially based prejudice and expression of 
contempt for the Japanese as a group, would be a factual matter to be determined in view of 
all the circumstances. 
317. See Note, supra note 261. 
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are race mixers to one degree or another. I say we must repeal the civil 
rights law, which takes jobs frem us whites and gives them to the niggers. 
The main reason why niggers want integration is because they want our 
white women. I am for law and order with the knowledge that you cannot 
have law and order and niggers too. Vote white. This time vote your convic-
tions by voting white racist J.B. Stoner into the run-off election for U.S. 
Senator.a18 
In each of those cases the court should be clearly within its dis-
cretion to determine that what underlay such sweeping indict-
ments of Japanese-Americans, Jews, and Blacks was not history 
but prejudice. In short, a judge or jury should be free to discern 
(and allow punishment of) bigotry masquerading as history or po-
litical science. 
And what of other "sciences"? Should William Shockley, a 
Nobel Laureate, be protected from any abridgment of his right to 
say that-on the basis on intelligence test scores-Blacks are ge-
netically inferior?319 According to the test suggested above, not 
necessarily. While the statistical results of Shockley's experiments 
would be protected, a court could constitutionally decide that his 
personal conclusion about racial inferiority was unwarranted. An 
analogous situation would exist where a study of illegitimate births 
indicated a higher percentage of babies born to single teenage 
Black mothers than to single teenage whites: it could be defama-
tory for one to state openly that the study proved beyond doubt 
that Black girls are predisposed to promiscuity simply because 
they are black. 
Similarly, a court would be well within constitutional bounds to 
hold that the display of swastikas does not contribute significantly 
to any important political discussion of fascism.320 Although that 
movement's generic symbol-the rod and bundle of arrows-bears 
legitimate political connotations, the swastika was Hitler's personal 
symbol as well as the insignia for the Nazis' anti-semitic ideology 
of "Aryan" superiority. Its display is essential only to convey the 
message that genocide is justifiable.321 Conversely, a court would be 
318. BELL, supra note 144, at 357. 
319. See the discussion in Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308 
(1979). 
320. This is possibly the critical element in the argument for regulation, at least under 
the authority of New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761-62 (1982). If courts believe that 
defamation (including symbolic speech) of a racial or ethnic group could be a likely part of 
politically significant speech, they will remain unwilling to permit its regulation or 
punishment. . 
321. A more likely modern question is where anti-Zionism fits into these issues. The 
conclusion of the D.C. Circuit Court in Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 
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within its discretion to adopt a more libertarian ap-
proach-without having to invoke constitutional necessity as its 
rationale. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Ferber, it will 
monitor not only the broad suppression of speech, but the overpro-
tection of verbal expression not entitled to shielding by the first 
amendment. su 
D. What Would Happen Elsewhere 
The test proposed above is necessary only under a constitutional 
form of government in which free speech is given an especially ex-
alted jurisprudential status-that is to say, only in America. But 
while the importance we accord the first amendment may reflect a 
noble and commendable preoccupation with fundamental liberty, 
the more restrictive approach of other "free" countries is no less 
high-minded, and could well prove the wiser course. 
As suggested earlier, it is not only a nation's social philosophy 
which determines the degree to which it will dictate or tolerate a 
system of laws, but its historical experience as well. S2S We have 
seen, for example, how Sweden limits the right of its citizens to 
defame a raceS2• or to wear an unauthorized military uniform in 
public. SIll No doubt these laws, enacted after World War II, were in 
direct response to the horrors of the Holocaust. While such provi-
sions would quickly be challenged in the United States and likely 
found wanting under the Constitution, in Sweden they remain ac-
cepted, untested, and innocuous. S28 
Just how personal freedoms are codified, therefore, depends 
upon one's orientation. Who is to say that the American Bill of 
F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969), is probably correct. The posi-
tion of the ADL that anti· Zionism per se constituted an appeal to racial or religious 
prejudice was not accepted by the court. In the facts, no direct expression of anti·Jewish 
attack was made. The court accepted the FCC's position that it would be impractical (and 
virtually impossible) to separate the appeals to reason and to prejudice. ld. at 172. But a 
direct anti·Semitic appeal to prejudice would be separable. Chief Justice Burger (then Cir-
cuit Judge) reminded the FCC of its "duty to consider a patten of libelous conduct," treat-
ing it as something distinct from the merely unpopular speech anti·Zionism was found to be. 
ld. 
322. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Ct. supra note 265. 
323. See supra notes 50·79 and accompanying text. 
324. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
325. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
326. Author's taped interviews (in May, 1982)' with Gunnar Karnell, Professor of Law 
at the Stockhom School of Economics; Per· Erik Nilsson, Chief Ombudsman of Sweden; 
Thorsten Cars, Swedish Press Ombudsman; and Gustaf Petren, a Justice on the Swedish 
Supreme Court. See also Oberg, supra note 237. 
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Rights is a better document than Sweden's Instrument of Govern-
ment, or that either is ethically or practically superior to the Ten 
Commandments? 
It is also important to note that what a constitution guarantees a 
country does not always deliver. The constitution of the Soviet 
Union, for one, is utopian in scope and scruple, but becomes a Big 
Lie in practice. S27 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The proper criteria by which any personal liberty-and particu-
larly the freedom of speech-must be measured are the degree to 
which it allows an individual to impose his speech on someone else, 
and the deleterious effect of that speech. If either the imposition 
or deleterious effect is excessive, the liberty must be restricted. Be-
cause the effect of racial defamation can only be deleterious, the 
degree of its imposition is irrelevant. It lacks any social, moral, or 
constitutional value. It is less real "speech" than the verbal coun-
terpart of a body blow to people targeted for its contempt, a rent 
in the fabric of American democracy. Such an approach is entirely 
consistent with the origin and development of the Bill of Rights. 
We have long refused to pervert the first amendment by saying 
that it shields obscene or dangerous speech. Likewise left unpro-
tected are utterances which cause damage to an individual's repu-
tation. But it is difficult to conceive of speech that is more damag-
ing to a free and civilized society than racial hatred and 
contempt-whether subtly undercutting human dignity or explic-
itly calling for the destruction of an entire race. 
Other democracies-Sweden, in particular-have chosen to· pro-
tect themselves and their people by banning such verbal as-
saults.ss8 In America, the courts have ruled that Nazis must be per-
mitted to march in public streets-but as Justice Blackmun 
observed, "[e]very court has had to apologize for that result."829 It 
is time for courts to stop apologizing, and to begin properly analyz-
ing what racial defamation is and what it is not. The legitimate 
interests of its victims, who in the long run include all of us, should 
not be sublimated to a blind (and in this case misplaced) principle. 
327. See Soviet Constitution, Chapters 6 & 7. 
328. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Not all democracies would base the 
prohibition of racial defamation on legalistic or moral grounds. For example, as an Austra-
lian law professor recently told the author in a private conversation, the Nazis would likely 
be prohibited from marching in the streets of Sydney "because it would be bad for tourism." 
329. Smith v. Collins, 436 U.S. 916, 918 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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Punishment of racial defamation has not jeopardized freedom 
elsewhere. Neither would democracy suffer in America, were Nazis 
prohibited from marching in Skokie. 
